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Temporary Eminent Domain
AMNON LEHAVI†
ABSTRACT
Times of emergency call for drastic measures. These steps may
include the physical takeover of privately-owned assets by the
government for a certain period of time and for various purposes, aimed
at addressing the state of emergency. When will such acts amount to a
taking, and what compensation should be paid to the property owner?
How do temporary physical appropriations during times of emergency
diverge, if at all, from temporary takeovers in more ordinary times?
The doctrinal and theoretical analysis of potential temporary takings
has been done mostly in the context of non-physical government
intervention with private property, such as when a local government
imposes a temporary moratorium on land development until a certain
condition is met. This Article focuses, however, on less investigated
scenarios of temporary physical takeovers or other forms of government
invasions. It seeks to identify the differences between a temporary
invasion and a permanent occupation of property considered a per se
taking under the Loretto rule. In so doing, this Article argues that while
the alleged distinction between prevention of public harm and promotion
of public benefit often proves untenable in evaluating whether a
permanent government measure constitutes a taking, it might make more
sense in exploring temporary acts.

† Dean and Atara Kaufman Professor of Real Estate, Harry Radzyner Law School, and
Academic Director, Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Herzliya. I thank Nestor Davidson, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Michael Heller, David Schleicher,
Jessica Shoemaker, and Joseph William Singer for helpful comments.
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Temporary eminent domain—referring here to various types of acts
amounting to time-limited physical takings, even if not initially
recognized as such by the government—may diverge from permanent
eminent domain in yet another key element: identifying the basis for just
compensation. Under long established (although often criticized) rules,
compensation for a permanent taking is based on identifying the “fair
market value” of the rights taken, while ignoring the effects that the
public use for which the underlying asset is taken might have on the
property’s long-term value.
The allegedly parallel metric used in the case of temporary takings,
one of “fair rental value,” may often prove inadequate, both practically
and normatively. This Article argues that because of unique aspects of
temporary physical takings, legal rules on compensation should often
seek to identify lost profits or actual damage. Moreover, in some cases,
in which there is a direct relation between the pre-appropriation use of
the asset and its post-appropriation use by the government, just
compensation might also be based on a certain portion of the value of the
public use. This is especially so when the time-sensitive value of the asset
during such public use is particularly high. On this point, the Article
offers an analogy to rules pertaining to compulsory licenses for patents.
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INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2020, after the COVID-19 virus started spreading
significantly across the United States, California Governor Gavin
Newsom issued an Executive Order aimed at addressing the crisis.1 The
Executive Order enabled the State of California, inter alia, to exercise its
power to “commandeer property . . . suitable for use as places of
temporary residence or medical facilities as necessary for quarantining,
isolating, or treating individuals who test positive for COVID-19 or who
have had a high-risk exposure and are thought to be in the incubation
period.”2 The governor acted pursuant to Section 8572 of the California
Government Code, authorizing him to “commandeer or utilize any
private property or personnel deemed by him necessary” during “a state
of war emergency or state of emergency,” provided that “the state shall
pay the reasonable value thereof.”3
The initial plan indeed focused on accommodating coronavirus
patients and other persons required to stay in isolation.4 The power to
coercively take over private property was to be reserved as a backup
option should the State not be able to provide enough spaces through
voluntary arrangements with hotels (such deals already being cut before
the Executive Order, such as with a hotel in San Carlos to house 120
people who had been on board the Grand Princess cruise ship).5
A few days later, when it turned out that, for the time being,
agreements made with hotels, in addition to the use of government
facilities, were able to meet demand for housing patients and others in
isolation, the focus shifted to another group requiring immediate
assistance: homeless people.6 Identifying the homeless in California as a
1. Exec. Order No. N-25-20 (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3.12.20-EO-N-25-20-COVID-19.pdf.
2. Id. § 8.
3. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8572 (West 2021).
4. See Taryn Luna, Newsom Issues Order Allowing California to Take Over Hotels for
Coronavirus Patients, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-03-12/california-governor-gavin-newsom-hotels-medical-facilitiespatients-meeting-requirements#:%7E:text%E2%80%A6.
5. See Melissa Daniels, Coronavirus Update: California Gets Power to Take Over
Hotels, Motels to Isolate Patients, PALM SPRINGS DESERT SUN (Mar. 12, 2020, 7:35 PM),
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2020/03/12/california-has-power-take-over-hotelscoronavirus-quarantines/5037215002/.
6. See Wes Venteicher & Theresa Clift, California Plans to Use Private Hotels, Motels
to Shelter Homeless People as Coronavirus Spreads, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 15, 2020, 5:38

2021]

TEMPORARY EMINENT DOMAIN

687

group of over 100,000 persons particularly vulnerable to contracting the
coronavirus—while regularly lacking access to medical care—and to
spreading the disease further, the State sought to accommodate the
homeless in hotels and motels.7
Accordingly, to meet the potential demand for temporary residences
not only for patients, people in quarantine, and the homeless, but also for
“first responders” such as medical personnel, cities across California have
also started to explore their own powers to commandeer property. Thus,
in San Francisco, the Office of the City Attorney published a
Memorandum on the “City Power to Commandeer Private Property for
COVID-19 Emergency Purposes.”8 The Memorandum outlines the
power granted to the mayor (requiring the concurrence of the Board of
Supervisors “as soon as reasonably possible”) to commandeer property
in times of emergency based on the City’s Charter and its Administrative
Code,9 and the parallel authority of the local health officer to do the same
(without the need for concurrence) under the California Health and Safety
Code.10
To commandeer property, the City must issue a written order to
commandeer and provide notice to the affected property owners. The
commandeer order “must present the City’s justification for its acts and
must narrowly tailor those acts to the particular circumstances,” requiring
the City to “establish the immediate necessity to commandeer the
particular property or properties at issue, document the emergency
conditions leading to the need to commandeer the property and the lack
of suitable alternatives.”11 The Charter and Administrative Code are
laconic about the payment of “fair value” and do not provide specific
procedures for determining such value. Moreover, the City may, but is
not required to, announce the sum to be paid, when it commandeers the

PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article241216061.html.
7. Id.; see also Sarah Holder & Kriston Capps, No Easy Fixes as Covid-19 Hits
Homeless Shelters, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Apr. 17, 2020, 5:34 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-17/no-easy-fixes-as-covid-19-hitshomeless-shelters.
8. Memorandum from Kristen A. Jensen & Brian F. Crossman, Deputy City Att’ys, City
& Cnty. of San Francisco, to London N. Breed, Mayor, City & Cnty. of San Francisco (Apr.
13, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter SF Memorandum].
9. Charter of the City of S.F., § 3.100(14); City of S.F., Admin. Code, § 7.6(b)(2).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120175 (West 2021).
11. SF Memorandum, supra note 8, at 4.
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property.12
Granting power to government to commandeer, or to otherwise take
over private property for a certain period of time to handle the COVID19 crisis—at least as a backup option while trying to reach agreements
with property owners to make their assets available—is obviously not
limited to California or to the United States at large. Countries throughout
the world have been grappling with the same basic issues.13 Thus, for
example, the government in India proclaimed its power to take over
hotels and convention halls for isolation, quarantine, and treatment of
COVID-19.14 Moreover, the need for government intervention stems also
from the fact that doctors and other frontline medical workers who rent
apartments have been evicted by their homeowners because of the fear
that they may be infected after working with coronavirus patients.15 Also,
the need to temporarily shelter homeless people in hotels has arisen in
other places across the world.16 Moreover, the need for urgent, temporary
accommodation also concerns violent spouses and their victims in view
of the surge in domestic violence as a result of lengthy stay-at-home
lockdowns.17
In addition to the explicit use of commandeer orders and
government’s general authority of eminent domain to temporarily seize
possession of private properties, other government actions undertaken to

12. Id. at 3.
13. See Anna Ahronheim, TA’s Dan Panorama, Jerusalem’s Dan to Open as Quarantine
Centers, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/danpanorama-and-hyatt-hotels-to-open-as-coronavirus-quarantine-centers-621200
(reporting
that the Israeli military took over temporary control and management of hotels); Feargus
O’Sullivan, Barcelona’s Latest Affordable Housing Tool: Seize Empty Apartments,
BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (July 16, 2020, 12:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-07-16/to-fill-vacant-units-barcelona-seizes-apartments (reporting that the City
of Barcelona took over empty vacation rentals for emergency housing during the pandemic).
14. Govt to Take Over Hotels, Convention Halls as Isolation Centres, TIMES OF INDIA
(Mar. 24, 2020, 4:44 AM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/govt-to-takeover-hotels-convention-halls-as-isolation-centres/articleshowprint/74783236.cms.
15. Jessie Yeung & Swati Gupta, Doctors Evicted from Their Homes in India as Fear
Spreads Amid Coronavirus Lockdown, CNN (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:34 AM), https://www
.cnn.com/2020/03/25/asia/india-coronavirus-doctors-discrimination-intl-hnk/index.html.
16. Emergency Hotel Accommodation Secured for All Rough Sleepers in Glasgow, SCOT.
HOUS. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.scottishhousingnews.com/article/emergencyhotel-accommodation-secured-for-all-rough-sleepers-in-glasgow.
17. Lee Yaron, In First, Israel Houses Abusive Men in Hotels to Protect Battered Women,
HAARETZ (May 7, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-in-first-israelhouses-abusive-men-in-hotels-to-protect-battered-women-1.8826256.
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address the COVID-19 pandemic also amount to de facto takeover of the
use of private assets. Thus, for example, in March and April of 2020,
then-President Donald Trump invoked the federal government’s wartime
powers, under the Defense Production Act,18 to order General Motors and
other key manufacturers to make ventilators,19 alongside a similar order
issued to the 3M Company to make N95 masks.20
As this Article shows, such combination of temporary measures,
including both the explicit use of eminent domain and similar
proceedings, alongside other forms of takeover of production and/or use
of an asset, was done by the U.S. government during the Second World
War. In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, while recognizing
such measures as amounting to temporary takings, established rules for
just compensation—the validity and appropriateness of which for current
purposes and for the entire plethora of temporary physical takings will be
explored.21
Accordingly, in this Article, I use the term “temporary eminent
domain” quite broadly to refer to various types of acts amounting to timelimited physical takings, even if not initially recognized as such by the
government. That is, in addition to explicit ex ante procedures of eminent
domain or commandeer orders, the term applies also to other measures
taken by government—the practical effect of which is to physically take
over control of the asset or to otherwise unequivocally redirect the use of
the asset to serve a certain public purpose for a certain period of time. If
such latter measures are recognized, or should be recognized, by courts
ex post as constituting a temporary “de facto condemnation”22 or inverse

18. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 4501.
19. Claire Bushey, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson & Kiran Stacey, Trump Invokes Federal
Law to Compel General Motors to Make Ventilators, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/9328d358-1588-4498-97d9-0dd43255a076; Taylor Hatmaker,
White House Says It Is Ordering More Companies to Make Ventilators, TECHCRUNCH (Apr.
2, 2020, 5:26 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/02/trump-coronavirus-dpa-gm-medtronic
-resmed/.
20. Maegan Vazquez, Trump Invokes Defense Production Act for Ventilator Equipment
and N95 Masks, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 2, 2020, 8:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/04/02/politics/defense-production-act-ventilator-supplies/index.html.
21. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, IV.A.
22. The doctrine of “de facto condemnation” applies when “an entity clothed with the
power of eminent domain substantially deprives an owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment
of his property.” In re Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d 553, 561–62 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017). It requires the plaintiff to prove that “the damages sustained were the
immediate, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of the eminent domain
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condemnation,23 this Article analyzes them under a more general
framework of “temporary eminent domain.” This is, of course, not to say
that all forms of temporary takeovers should be considered as
compensable takings per se. This Article identifies, rather, the normative
criteria for identifying certain types of temporary takeovers as takings.
By focusing on temporary physical takeovers, and on whether these
constitute compensable takings, this Article takes a different route from
the more common analysis of “temporary takings” that deals with nonphysical or regulatory interventions with private property—such as when
a local government imposes a temporary moratorium on land
development until a certain condition is met. The thick and often complex
(and incoherent) body of doctrine that developed in examining such
temporary regulations is based primarily on the three-prong balancing
test of Penn Central24 for permanent regulations, and its adaptation to
temporary regulations in cases such as First English25 and Tahoe-Sierra26
(analyzed in Part III.A).
In this Article, I argue that temporary physical takeovers, and the
extent to which they constitute “temporary eminent domain,” merit a
distinctive type of analysis because of the qualitative differences between
the two categories. Such differences relate not only to the types of
circumstances under which government is temporarily taking over (as
opposed to regulating) private property, but also to the diverging
normative justifications for recognizing such actions as takings and for
setting the standards for evaluating just compensation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II portrays some fundamental
legal principles concerning permanent takings. It starts by briefly
highlighting the development of per se rules versus balancing tests for
various types of permanent government measures. It then identifies and
evaluates the distinction drawn in Hadacheck27 and subsequent cases
between government interference with property intended to prevent a

power.” Id. at 561.
23. An “inverse condemnation” claim is the more general term used when a claimant
institutes a suit, alleging that a taking has occurred, and requiring compensation for it. See
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1065 (9th ed. 2018).
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
26. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
27. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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“public bad” and that which seeks to promote a public benefit.
Part III moves to discuss the current legal landscape of temporary
takings. It analyzes case law that deals with various types of temporary
measures—physical or regulatory—and whether these amount to
compensable takings. It then explores the principles developed to
establish just compensation in cases that are considered as amounting to
a temporary taking, mostly by identifying “fair rental value” as a
replacement for “fair market value.”
Part IV seeks to re-conceptualize and normatively reevaluate
“temporary eminent domain.” It starts by outlining the plethora of cases
in which government may temporarily take over private property, and
how this may happen not only during times of emergency but also in
“wait periods.” It then readdresses the public harm/public benefit
distinction, suggesting that such a test might make more sense for
temporary takeovers as compared with assessing permanent measures. In
addition to identifying economic consequences of temporary takeovers,
this part also looks at non-instrumental injuries that may occur, and how
these diverge from cases of permanent takeovers.
Part IV also examines the ways in which, in the case of
contemporary takeovers, there is greater likelihood of affinity between
the pre-appropriation use and the temporary post-appropriation use,
paying particular attention to scenarios in which government use may be
considered opportunistic. It then draws an analogy from the use of
compulsory licenses for patents, in which the length of time of the license
and its particular timing during the twenty-year life of the patent may be
crucial. These insights form the basis for a new taxonomy of temporary
takeovers as compensable takings.
Part IV then establishes practical and normative principles for
calculating just compensation for temporary eminent domain. It starts by
presenting the “fair rental value” criterion, established by the Supreme
Court, mostly in dealing with temporary takeovers during the Second
World War. This criterion is, however, often impractical, such as when
the asset has no rental value because of the underlying emergency
situation, like in the case of empty hotels in the coronavirus crisis.
Moreover, such a criterion may be also flawed normatively, because it
disregards particular types of losses that a property owner may incur
because of the temporary nature of the government use, i.e., before the
forced appropriation and after its release from the public use, in a manner
not reflected in regular rates of market rents. This uniqueness of
temporary takeovers, as opposed to permanent ones, may require courts
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to consider compensation for actual damages or lost profits.
Moreover, whereas in the case of permanent eminent domain the
property owner is not entitled to share in any surplus to the asset’s value
resulting from the public use, a case can be made for such revenue/benefit
sharing in temporary eminent domain because of the particular affinity
between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses. Here too, the
Article draws an analogy from the way in which royalties are paid to
patent owners in the case of compulsory licenses. This analysis sets the
stage for a comprehensive new legal taxonomy of temporary eminent
domain.
II.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF
(PERMANENT) TAKINGS

A. Per Se Rules versus Balancing Tests
Takings jurisprudence has been long portrayed as a “muddle.”28 It is
no wonder. There are so many forms of government interventions with
private property: physical or regulatory, temporal or permanent, complete
or partial, benign or opportunistic, and so forth, such that it is extremely
challenging, both normatively and practically, to draw the line between
legitimate government action and a compensable taking.
Trying to address the plethora of incidents of government
intervention with private property, the Supreme Court has sought to
identify types of actions that are considered per se takings, those that
require an ad hoc balancing test to determine whether the action amounts
to a taking, and other actions that are viewed as a legitimate exercise of
police power or another source of authority (such as the broad
constitutional legitimacy awarded to zoning since the 1926 Village of
Euclid case).29 While such line-drawing has been often criticized, it
serves as a starting point for evaluating the essence of government
actions, including temporary takeovers that are the focus of this Article.
Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has identified, so far, three
types of government actions that amount to per se takings. The first two
categories described below address permanent physical appropriations,
whereas the third category addresses a particular subset of permanent

28. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
29. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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regulations.
First, under the Loretto rule, any form of “permanent physical
occupation of another’s property” amounts to a taking.30 While this is
obviously the case when the government explicitly exercises its power of
eminent domain, it is also valid for other types of permanent occupations
of land by the government or by public utilities. Moreover, the Loretto
rule also applies when the permanent occupation takes place on part of
the relevant parcel (such as the TV cable installation occupying only
portions of Ms. Loretto’s roof and the side of her building).31 Partial
permanent physical takings are also per se takings.32 The scope of
permanent physical occupation out of the whole parcel matters only for
calculating the amount of just compensation.
Second, in the Horne case,33 the Supreme Court held that physical
appropriation of personal property is a per se taking, and should not be
distinguished in this respect from real property. Horne dealt with
“marketing orders,” promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture under
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, to help maintain
stable markets for particular agricultural products. The marketing order
for raisins established a committee that imposed a reserve requirement,
by which growers set aside each year a certain percentage of their crop
for the U.S. government, free of charge. The government made use of
those raisins by selling them in noncompetitive markets, donating them,
or disposing of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the
program. If any profits were left over after subtracting the government’s
expenses from administering the program, the net proceeds were
distributed back to the raisin growers.34
The Supreme Court held that such a mandatory reserve requirement
amounts to physical appropriation and that this constitutes a per se
compensable taking. Any net proceeds the raisin growers received from
the sale of the reserve raisins went to the amount of compensation they

30. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
31. See id. at 421–22.
32. This does not mean, of course, that partial permanent physical takings may not
generate normative and practical difficulties, such as when the partial taking also adversely
effects the relative value of the remaining property left for the owner. See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2043, 2065 (2017).
33. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
34. In the relevant years, raisin growers were required to set aside between 30 to 47
percent of their crops. Id. at 2421.
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received for that taking, but it did not mean the raisins were not
appropriated. Going back to the history of the Takings Clause, against the
backdrop of personal property appropriations during the Revolutionary
War, the Court emphasized the “longstanding distinction” between
regulations concerning the use of property and those regarding
government acquisition of property.35 Accordingly, the Court noted that
while an owner of personal property may expect that a new regulation of
the use of property could “render his property economically worthless,”
when it comes to physical appropriations, people do not expect their
property to be actually occupied or taken away.36
The first two per se rules address, therefore, permanent physical
appropriations. These rules apply even if the taking is partial, such that it
covers also permanent takeovers of only part of the actual asset, or when
the owner loses title to the property but maintains certain proceeds from
it.
Third, under the Lucas rule, any permanent regulation “that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use” is considered as a compensable
taking unless an “inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”37
Citing earlier case law that supports this proposition, the Court in Lucas
states that while “[w]e have never set forth justification for this rule,” this
may be simply so because “total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”38
Needless to say, such an allegedly categorical rule still leaves open
many unresolved questions, such as whether it denies a taking claim by
those who acquire title in the land after the enactment of a certain
regulation, or when the regulation does not apply to the entire parcel.39
The latter point has been particularly challenging. In the Penn Central
decision, addressed in more detail below, Justice Brennan noted that “[i]n
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses . . . on the nature and extent of the interference with

35. Id. at 2422 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).
36. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992)).
37. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
38. Id. at 1017.
39. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 23, at 1084–88.

2021]

TEMPORARY EMINENT DOMAIN

695

rights in the parcel as a whole.”40 Identifying the “whole parcel” can
prove, however, a tricky task. In fact, ever since the 1922 Pennsylvania
Coal case,41 which established the regulatory takings doctrine, courts
have tried to address the question of identifying the relevant parcel for a
given regulation—e.g., in Pennsylvania Coal, regarding whether to
distinguish between three separate estates in the mining property: surface,
minerals, and support of the surface.42 The problem of “conceptual
severance,”43 or that of determining the “proper denominator in the
takings fraction,”44 is persistent in the post-Lucas era, and is even
exacerbated by it, because it may decide if the per se rule would apply.
This is so when the value of a certain part of the land (or a certain right
thereto) is fully deprived, but the land in its entirety preserves some value,
so it is not stripped of “all economically beneficial use.”45 Such
complications raise doubts, therefore, about the feasibility of any sort of
a per se rule when applied to regulatory takings, which are generally
governed by a balancing test adopted in Penn Central.46
The Penn Central decision, and the prongs of its ad hoc balancing,

40. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
41. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. In Pennsylvania Coal Company, Justice Holmes stated that the underlying Kohler
Act “purports to abolish” the estate in the supports of the surface. Id. at 414; Justice Brandeis,
however, stressed that the rights of an owner are not increased “by dividing the interests in
his property.” Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. The use of this term in the academic literature is attributed to Margaret Jane Radin,
The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667, 1674 (1988).
44. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
45. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943, 1949 (2017). Thus, for example, in Murr,
the Supreme Court inquired whether a merger provision in Wisconsin law, by which adjacent
lots under common ownership may not be “sold or developed as separate lots” if they do not
meet certain size requirements, should be examined by looking at the value diminution of
each one of the lots, or of the merged parcel as a whole. Id. at 1940. The Court offered a
balancing test for deciding this question, including “treatment of the land under state and local
law; the physical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regulated land.”
Id. at 1945. This means that the Court engages in a “step zero” balancing test to decide whether
the affected piece of land, or right thereto, stands on its own to then decide whether it was
deprived of all economically beneficial use in order to apply the per se rule under Lucas. Lynn
E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 48–49 (2017); see also Steven J.
Eagle, Property Rights and Takings Burdens, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 199,
222–23 (2018) (arguing that the balancing test in the Murr decision for establishing “the
parcel as a whole” test conflates the definition of property rights with the type of regulation
imposed on them, and is therefore both conceptually and normatively problematic).
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
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referred to Pennsylvania Coal as the “leading case for the proposition that
a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a
‘taking.’”47 The Court referred also to the Armstrong case, according to
which the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”48
When do “justice and fairness” require the exercise of the Takings
Clause? The Court in Penn Central sought to identify “several factors
that have particular significance”49 in determining when government
regulation amounts to a compensable taking. While the Court listed
numerous factors without offering a scale or internal priority among such
factors,50 three such considerations have come to be identified as Penn
Central’s ad hoc three-prong test: “[t]he economic impact of the
regulation,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of
governmental action.”51 Much has been written about these three prongs,
trying to make sense of each one of them and of the internal relations
between them, and whether the Court’s look at the nature and “extent of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole” should be viewed as
an independent prong, or one embedded in the three-prong test.52
While conceptually and normatively confusing and vague, the Penn
Central’s three-prong test and the bottom line of its implementation in
subsequent case law have been, practically speaking, clear enough. With
the rare exception of a land use regulation “that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use” when considering “the parcel as a whole”—
with such cases in any way governed by Lucas’s per se rule—the Penn
Central’s ad hoc analysis rarely results in the conclusion that a regulation
amounts to a taking. Moving from theory to practice, the Penn Central’s
ad hoc test has essentially resulted in a “no takings” rule for land use

47. Id. at 127.
48. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
50. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 131–132 (2002)
(listing the various factors, and concluding that these factors lack an internal order or clear
methodology, such that all “one can say for certain is that the method is ad hoc”).
51. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
52. Eagle, supra note 45, at 208–16 (emphasis added).
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regulation.53
Thus, broadly speaking, when permanent government measures are
concerned, one can see a practical distinction between two per se
categories. Permanent physical takings of property, even if partial in
scope, are always a taking. Permanent regulation of property is almost
never a taking.
B. Prevention of Public Harm versus Promotion of Public Benefit
Another type of per se rule that has emerged in early takings
jurisprudence, although it has been criticized both in the literature and in
subsequent case law, concerns a distinction between government
measures that seek to prevent public harms and those that promote a
public benefit. A series of early twentieth-century Supreme Court cases
suggested that “harmful or noxious uses” of property may be proscribed
by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. In
the 1915 Hadacheck case,54 the Court upheld an ordinance of the City of
Los Angeles banning the operation of a brick yard or brick kiln, or any
establishment for the manufacture or burning of bricks within described
limits of the City. Hadacheck was the owner of a tract of land that was
outside the limits of the City and distant from residential properties when
he had purchased it. The tract had a highly valuable bed of clay, and the
owner incurred major expenditures to excavate the clay, and erected
expensive machinery for the manufacture of bricks. Hadacheck argued
that compelling him to abandon his business would deprive him of the
use of his property, also because the deep excavations made the land
unsuitable for residential purposes.55
The Court upheld the ordinance, reasoning that it fell within the
City’s broad police powers and that a “vested interest cannot be asserted
against it because of conditions once obtaining. To do so would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.”56
Emphasizing that “there is no prohibition of the removal of brick clay;
only a prohibition within the designated locality of its manufacture into
bricks,” and that “there is no allegation or proof of other objectionable

53. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 45–56 (2016).
54. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915).
55. Id. at 405–06.
56. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
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businesses being permitted within the district,” the Court validated the
City’s act as “an honest exercise of judgment upon the circumstances
which induced its action.”57
Hadacheck, and other decisions such as the 1928 Miller case,58
understood as drawing a line between measures aimed at preventing a
public harm and those intended to promote a public good, such that the
former category is not a taking, have been broadly criticized. Frank
Michelman identifies the “basic difficulty with the method of classifying
regulations as compensable or not according to whether they prevent
harms or extract benefits” in that “such a method will not work unless we
can establish a benchmark of ‘neutral’ conduct which enables us to say
where refusal to confer benefits (not reversible without compensation)
slips over into readiness to inflict harms (reversible without
compensation).”59 Such line-drawing is hard, conceptually and
normatively.60
This distinction has been substantially undermined in the Lucas case,
according to which “the ‘harmful or noxious uses’ principle” was “the
Court’s early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government
may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by
regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate—a reality we
nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the
State’s police power.”61 Rejecting the existence of some objective
conception of “noxiousness” for purposes of a takings analysis, the Court
in Lucas noted that “the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and
‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.”62
Accordingly, “it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot
serve as a touchstone to distinguish ‘regulatory takings’—which require
compensation—from regulatory deprivations that do not require

57. Id. at 412–14.
58. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a state regulation requiring that
the owners of red cedar trees infected with a red cedar rust, a fungus, cut them down to protect
apple orchards that can be killed by this rust).
59. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1197 (1967).
60. Thus, Michelman considers the example of a regulation forbidding the erection of
billboards along the highway, and asks, “Shall we construe this regulation as one which
prevents the ‘harms’ of roadside blight and distraction, or as one securing the ‘benefits’ of
safety and amenity?” Id.
61. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (1992).
62. Id. at 1024.
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compensation.”63 Per the Court, at any rate, none of the cases such as
Hadacheck that had “employed the logic of ‘harmful use’ prevention to
sustain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation wholly
eliminated the value of the claimant’s land.”64
Abandoning the harm-preventing/benefit-conferring distinction, the
Court in Lucas adopted a different benchmark for deciding whether a
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use may
nevertheless not require the government to pay compensation to the
owner. This would be so “only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with.”65 Such an inquiry requires the
government to point out “the restrictions that background principles of
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership” prior to the disputed regulation.66
While the Court in Lucas sought to undermine the harm/benefit
distinction, by replacing it with a different concept of “background
principles,” the Court seems to have consciously conflated the two
concepts in the 2001 Palazzolo case.67 Suggesting that the identification
of “background principles” in the relevant state law must rely on
“objective factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed,”68 Justice
Kennedy looked, inter alia, at “the degree of harm to public lands and
resources . . . posed by the claimant’s proposed activities.” The concept
of harm was therefore viewed as an “objective” factor, and not as one that
is merely “in the eye of the beholder.”
The tension between Lucas and Palazzolo leaves room for doubt
about the current status of the harm-preventing/benefit-conferring
distinction in the Court’s jurisprudence. That said, I suggest that
abandoning this distinction altogether might be counter-productive. This
is so because it would inadvertently undermine our ability to assess the
true motivations and goals of government in undertaking a certain
regulatory step, at least in the sense of identifying the private parties that
stand to gain and those that would lose, as compared with the status quo

63. Id. at 1026.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1027.
66. Id. at 1029.
67. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 612–13 (2001).
68. Id. at 630 (quoting, interestingly, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030).
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ante, from the regulation.
Thus, for example, even if a certain pre-existing use, such as
manufacturing of bricks, is not actionable in private nuisance by adjacent
landowners, a normative assessment of the acts or omissions of the
relevant parties might serve as a benchmark for identifying the necessity
of the regulation, the appropriateness of the means chosen to achieve a
certain end, and the normative desirability of the allocation of costs and
benefits on the various private parties affected by the government
regulation. In some cases, such an evaluation might also assist in deciding
whether the government should re-shift at least part of this allocation by
paying compensation to the owner.
Generally speaking, a normative inquiry of the nature and scope of
the pre-regulation use of the asset, as compared with its post-regulation
use by the owner, can include the following two factors.
First, are the external effects of the pre-regulation use of the asset on
adjacent owners, or on society at large, an inevitable by-product of an
otherwise productive use by the owner? In other words, to the extent that
the market value of the asset before the regulation derives from the
societal positive value of the underlying activity, and not from a mere
“opportunistic value” of holding out vis-à-vis adjacent owners or a public
authority, then the existence of external effects can justify regulation
intended to mitigate or eliminate them. However, the legitimacy of such
a regulation should not disqualify the owner from making a regulatory
taking claim under the Loretto rule (if the property loses all of its market
value) or Penn Central rule (if diminution of value is partial).
Second, the legitimacy of the pre-regulation use for purposes of a
takings analysis would be particularly strong, even if it has negative
external effects on others, when such use is generally typified as falling
under the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome,69 and not as a flatly
illegal or socially undesirable conduct regardless of time and place.
Going back to the Hadacheck case, there is no doubt that the
manufacturing of bricks is generally a socially desirable enterprise (as is
the case with waste disposal facilities, power stations, and other types of
NIMBY uses). The problem lies in its specific location, such that the
purpose of the regulation is to move this type of action to a different
location, but not to eliminate it altogether. This therefore means that
while the pre-regulation use can be considered as “obnoxious” or as a
69. For the NIMBY syndrome, see generally Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
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“nuisance” to others at a specific location, and this justifies, in turn,
regulation that would have the effect of shifting this otherwise productive
activity elsewhere,70 the landowner should not be barred from making a
regulatory takings claim if she loses the entire market value (Lucas, per
se rule) or part of it (Penn Central, balancing test).
As I show in Part IV.B, such an analysis may prove particularly
useful for temporary takeovers. While in some cases, a temporary
takeover should be considered as a compensable taking because the
reason for the takeover has nothing to do with the pre-regulation use of
the asset, or that such use is “blameless,” in other cases a temporary
takeover can be grounded in halting a damaging effect resulting from the
asset’s use, which is not inherent to it, but may still require a temporary
intervention by the government. Some types of temporary government
interventions, aimed at preventing a public bad during an emergency,
should not be considered as a compensable taking.
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF TEMPORARY TAKINGS
A. Physical versus Regulatory Temporary Takings
This section identifies the current doctrine concerning temporary
takings. It highlights the key cases that addressed an explicit temporary
use of the power of eminent domain, especially during the Second World
War, alongside other cases involving a temporary takeover or another
time-limited physical intrusion of private property—and how such other
forms of intrusion were viewed more contingently by the courts. This
section then addresses temporary regulations, and the development of the
doctrine since the initial recognition by the Court of the concept of a
temporary regulatory taking in the 1987 First English case.71 It then
presents a balancing test for temporary takings developed in the Arkansas
Game and Fish Commission case,72 in the context of government flooding
of private property, which may be viewed as a distinct category of cases

70. In fact, the legitimacy of shifting otherwise productive uses to their “proper”
geographical spaces is what underlies the power of zoning. As the Supreme Court famously
stated in the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926):
“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor instead
of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”
71. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 337
(1987).
72. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38–39 (2012).
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involving government physical interference with property that
nevertheless falls short of full-scale government appropriation for public
use.
During the Second World War, and in its aftermath, the U.S.
Supreme Court discussed a number of cases in which the federal
government took possession of private property for a certain period of
time and for certain purposes related to its operation during the wartime
emergency.
In United States v. General Motors,73 the U.S. Attorney General
instituted in June 1942 proceedings for the condemnation of occupancy
of space in a warehouse building in Chicago, which was under a twentyyear lease by General Motors, for a term ending on June 30, 1943.74
Following a court order, granting the U.S. government immediate
possession, General Motors removed its personal property and certain
fixtures from the space, and handed it over a few days later. At the end of
this term, General Motors was set to reoccupy and use the space until the
end of its lease term. While there was no dispute that the temporary
condemnation amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court ruled on the measure of just compensation. It held that
General Motors was entitled to payment beyond mere rental value,
because of the specific expenditures it made and the damages it incurred,
such as destruction of certain fixtures removed from the space.75
In United States v. Petty Motors,76 the U.S. government petitioned
for condemnation of the temporary use for public purposes of a building
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The petition, filed on November 9, 1942, sought
to take the use of the building for the government through June 30, 1945.
The premises were occupied by various tenants, including Petty Motors,
with diverging terms of leases, but none exceeding the end date of the
government use. As with the General Motors case, the U.S. government
did not dispute its duty to compensate the tenants for the remaining term
of their lease. However, differently from the General Motors case, in
which the term of the lease of the petitioner exceeded the term of the

73. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374–75 (1945).
74. Id. at 374–75. The proceedings were premised in the authority of the U.S. Secretary
of War under Section 201 of Title II of the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942. 50
U.S.C. app. § 632.
75. For the ruling of the Court on the measure of compensation in this case, see text
accompanying infra notes 129–34.
76. United States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 (1945).
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temporary government use and thus only part of the lease was taken such
that the petitioner was set to reoccupy the premises at the end of the
temporary public use, in the Petty Motors case, the temporary eminent
domain condemned all interests in the leaseholds. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that just compensation should be based on the market
value of the rent for the relevant period, and it should not also include the
costs of removal or relocation.77
Unlike the above two cases, in Kimball Laundry v. United States,78
the temporary public use was inherently tied to the pre-condemnation use.
The U.S. government sought to acquire a right to temporary use and
occupancy of Kimball Laundry to provide laundry and dry-cleaning
services for members of the armed forces. The petition to condemn
Kimball Laundry’s plant in Omaha, Nebraska, was filed on November
21, 1942. The property was finally returned on March 23, 1946. Most of
Kimball Laundry’s 180 employees were retained during that time, and
one of the owners stayed on as operating manager. At the same time,
having no other means of serving its customers, Kimball suspended
business to its clientele for the duration of the U.S. Army’s occupancy.79
As I show in Part III.B below, the affinity between the pre-appropriation
and post-appropriation uses impacted the Court’s method for evaluating
just compensation. This is so because the government’s use of the plant
as a laundry—while retaining the petitioner’s employees for that
purpose—appropriated the petitioner’s opportunity to profit from its trade
routes throughout the period of the government takeover. This required
the government to pay the petitioner for its lost profits, reflecting its
going-concern value, rather than paying some abstract “fair rental
value.”80
Yet another case of temporary government takeover illustrating an
affinity between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses was
discussed in United States v. Pewee Coal.81 The respondent was a coal
mine operator whose property was allegedly possessed and operated by
the U.S. government from May 1 to October 12, 1943, to avert a nationwide strike of miners. On May 1, 1943, the U.S. President issued an
Executive Order, directing the Secretary of Interior “to take immediate
77. Id. at 379–81.
78. 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
79. Id. at 3.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 137–40.
81. 341 U.S. 114, 117 (1951).
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possession, so far as may be necessary or desirable, of any and all mines
producing coal in which a strike or stoppage has occurred or is threatened
. . . and to operate or arrange for the operation of such mines.”82 The Court
held that “having taken Pewee’s property, the United States became liable
under the Constitution to pay just compensation.” While “[o]rdinarily,
fair compensation for a temporary possession of a business enterprise is
the reasonable value of the property’s use,” the Court ruled that such a
measure of compensation was not required in that particular case, and that
the United States was properly required to bear that portion of operating
losses attributable to increased wage payments made to comply with a
War Labor Board decision.83
While in all of the Second World War cases discussed above, there
was no real controversy about the liability of the government to pay
compensation for its temporary use of eminent domain, later cases
showed a more cautious approach about automatically labeling any sort
of temporary government invasion of private property as a compensable
taking. Thus, in a footnote in the Loretto case, Justice Marshall reasoned
that “[t]he permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation
distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. Not
every physical invasion is a taking . . . such temporary limitations are
subject to a more complex balancing process to determine whether they
are a taking.”84 In so doing, Justice Marshall refers both to intermittent
flooding cases, discussed further below, and to other limits on the right
to exclude that the Court did not consider as a taking. These instances
include the PruneYard Shopping Center case,85 in which the Court upheld
a state constitutional requirement in California that shopping center
owners permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on
their property, under certain reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.86 As the Court in Loretto, referring to PruneYard, noted:
“[s]ince the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, and since the
owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons [i.e., patrons]
from his property, ‘the fact that [the solicitors] may have ‘physically
invaded’ [the owners’] property cannot be viewed as determinative.”87

82. Id. at 115–16.
83. Id. at 117–18.
84. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982).
85. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
86. Id. at 84.
87. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84).
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That said, the Court re-emphasized later, in the Tahoe-Sierra case
discussed below, the “distinction between physical takings and regulatory
takings.”88 Accordingly, when the government takes physical possession
of a property interest to serve a public purpose, “it has a categorical duty
to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest . . .
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation
is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government occupies the
property for its own purposes, even though that use is temporary.”89
Therefore, while Loretto might have been understood as subjecting
temporary physical appropriation to a balancing test, Tahoe-Sierra seems
to reinstate a per se rule for recognizing such a measure as a compensable
taking, whenever the government “occupies the property for its own
purposes.” This phrasing may still leave room, however, for
distinguishing this category from other cases in which the government
allows other persons to temporarily invade the property,90 or when the
physical presence of the government falls short of full-scale occupation.
This point will be taken further, later in this section, in discussing rules
on government flooding.
What about temporary regulations? When would such non-physical
forms of intermittent intervention with private property amount to a
compensable taking or “inverse condemnation”?
The first explicit consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court of a

88. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321
(2002).
89. Id. at 322 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
90. Thus, for example, in the 2019 decision in the matter of Cedar Point Nursery v.
Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524, 524 (9th Cir. 2019), the federal Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) held
that a regulation in California under the State’s Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA),
which allows union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer work sites under
specific circumstances, does not amount to a per se taking. The court reasoned that the
petitioners-employers “have not suffered a permanent physical invasion that would constitute
a per se taking because the sole property right affected by the regulation is the right to exclude”
and petitioners “do not allege that other property rights are affected by the access regulation.”
Id. at 532–33. Moreover, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “[a]s
structured, the regulation does not grant union organizers a ‘permanent and continuous right
to pass to and from such that the Growers’ property ‘may continuously be traversed.’” Id. at
532. In addition, the court reasoned that unlike in Nollan, the contested regulation “does not
allow random members of the public to unpredictably traverse their property 24 hours a day,
365 days a year.” Cedar Point Nursery, 932 F.3d at 532. As of the date of the publication of
this Article, this case is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 844 (2020).
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temporary regulation as potentially a compensable taking was made in
the 1987 First English case.91 The appellant was the owner of land on
which it operated a campground and a retreat center. Following a flood
that destroyed the buildings, Los Angeles County adopted an interim
ordinance prohibiting the construction of any building or structure in an
interim flood protection area that included the land. Shortly after the
ordinance was adopted, the appellant filed suit, alleging that the
ordinance denied all use of the land and seeking to recover damages in
inverse condemnation.92
While the Court did not explicitly decide that the said interim
regulation was a taking, it did recognize in principle that a temporary
regulation amounting to a taking should be compensable. Referring to its
Second World War cases, the Court found “substantial guidance in cases
where the government has only temporarily exercised its right to use
private property,” reasoning that “these cases reflect the fact that
‘temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation.”93 This also means that
where a temporary regulation amounts to a taking, government is
required to “pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during
this period,” such that the mere “[i]nvalidation of the ordinance or its
successor ordinance after this period of time, though converting the
taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the
demands of the Just Compensation Clause.”94
While First English might have been initially understood as
recognizing a per se rule for a temporary regulatory taking, where a
certain regulation denies a “landowner all use of his property” during the
specific period of time in which the regulation was in force, the Court
took a different approach in the 2002 Tahoe-Sierra case.95 It held that

91. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 307
(1987).
92. Id. at 306–08.
93. Id. at 318.
94. Id. at 319. The Court further emphasizes that “once a court determines that a taking
has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available—
amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent
domain,” but nevertheless, “where the government’s activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.” Id. at 321.
95. Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and
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temporary regulations should be generally analyzed under Penn Central’s
balancing tests to determine whether a temporary taking has occurred.96
Accordingly, the imposition by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) of two moratoria, totaling 32 months, on development in the
Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for
the area, was not a per se temporary taking.
Unlike the reliance on the temporary physical taking cases in First
English as a source of “substantial guidance” for corresponding cases of
temporary regulations, in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court seeks to clearly
distinguish the two categories. Accordingly, it states that whereas its
“jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as
the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward
application of per se rules . . . [o]ur regulatory takings jurisprudence, in
contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by ‘essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries.’”97
In the context of temporary interventions, the Court reiterates the
principle by which compensation is due for a physical appropriation per
se, even if it applies to only part of the land or when it is temporary. In
contrast, the Court rejects the petitioners’ attempt to bring the case under
the Lucas rule by arguing that the 32-month segment of the moratoria can
be severed from each landowner’s fee simple estate to examine whether
this segment’s entire value was taken. Reasoning that “[w]ith property so
divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the
normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings,” the
Court notes that the petitioners’ “conceptual severance” argument ignores
Penn Central’s admonition that, in regulatory takings cases, the focus is
on “the parcel as a whole.”98
Per the Court, “[a]n interest in real property is defined by the metes
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years
that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest” and “[b]oth
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its
entirety.”99 Thus, a temporary restriction that “merely causes a
diminution in value is not a taking of ‘the parcel as a whole,’” such that
a “fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary
Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENV’T L. 479, 482-83 (2010).
96. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
97. Id. at 321–22.
98. Id. at 331.
99. Id. at 332.
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prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted.”100
Nevertheless, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra considers when such type
of temporary public burden “in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”101 But it rules that concepts of fairness and
justice “will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central
approach.”102 Accordingly, the Court refused to identify a certain period
of time beyond which a moratorium should be considered unreasonable
and constituting a taking, reasoning that the duration of the restriction is
one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of
a regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that factor as with respect
to other factors, the “temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in
either direction must be resisted.”103 In subsequent federal case law,
courts also avoided establishing per se rules for temporary regulations
that exhibit an “extraordinary delay” or even “erroneous delay” (for
regulations overturned by courts as invalid).104
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, courts have largely denied
various petitions against temporary eviction moratoria promulgated by
cities, states, and the federal government—such moratoria explicitly
aimed at preventing the “further spread of COVID-19.”105 These petitions
sought to issue preliminary injunctions against such moratoria, with some
petitions arguing that the contested eviction moratorium amounts, inter
alia, to a violation of the Takings Clause.
In Baptiste v. Kennealy,106 the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts
denied such a claim, targeted at a moratorium on evictions and
foreclosures enacted by the State of Massachusetts.107 The court held,

100. Id.
101. Id. at 321 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
102. Id. at 342.
103. Id.
104. See Siegel & Meltz, supra note 95, at 485–96 (surveying this complex and often
inconsistent case law).
105. For the federal moratorium, see Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent
the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Sept. 4, 2020) [hereinafter CDC
Eviction Moratorium]. On March 31, 2021, the CDC Eviction Moratorium was extended
through June 30, 2021. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread
of COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 16,731 (Mar. 31, 2021).
106. No. 1:20-CV-11335-MLW, 2020 WL 5751572, at *20 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2020).
107. Act Providing for a Moratorium on Evictions and Foreclosures During the COVID-
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first, that the petitioners are “unlikely to prove that a physical taking
occurred when the Moratorium was enacted because plaintiffs voluntarily
rented their property to their tenants.”108
Second, the court held that the plaintiffs “are also unlikely to show
that a ‘categorical’ or ‘non-categorical’ regulatory taking has
occurred.”109 As for a “categorical” regulatory taking under the Lucas
rule, the court reasoned that “[a]s the Moratorium, and any prohibition on
economically beneficial use it imposes, was when enacted only
temporary, and plaintiffs do not contend the Act has rendered their
properties valueless, no categorical regulatory taking has occurred.”110
As for the “non-categorial” regulatory taking under the Penn Central
test, the court concluded that plaintiffs “are not likely to prove that there
was a non-categorial regulatory taking.”111 This is so because under the
Penn Central first factor, concerning the “economic impact” of the
moratorium, the court reasoned that plaintiffs “have only been
temporarily deprived of income from their property,” and the moratorium
“temporarily bars plaintiffs from evicting their tenants and from renting
their properties to people who will pay them to rent,” but such a
“temporary delay . . . is not sufficient to constitute a taking.”112 The court
acknowledges, however, that the moratorium implicates the Penn Central
second factor, in that it “does significantly interfere with plaintiff’s
reasonable investment backed expectations.”113 As for the third factor
regarding the “character of the governmental action,” the court reasoned
that the moratorium is a “public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”114 The court thus
concluded that the eviction moratorium does not amount to a regulatory
taking.115

19 Emergency. H.B. 4647, 191st Gen. Ct. (Ma. 2020).
108. Baptiste, 2020 WL 5751572, at *20. Per the court, the moratorium did not compel
plaintiffs to “submit to the physical occupation of the land” or to “rent their properties,” and
the moratorium’s provisions fall within the State’s “broad power to regulate housing
conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *22.
112. Id. at *21.
113. Id. at *22.
114. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
115. Other federal courts have also rejected petitions for a preliminary injunction targeted
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Finally, one needs to consider a line of cases that may be viewed as
constituting a middle category between quintessential temporary eminent
domain and temporary regulations, namely cases that involve a temporary
governmental invasion of property, but that fall short of full-scale
appropriation for public use. These cases often involve a temporary
government flooding of land.
In the 2012 Arkansas Game and Fish Commission case,116 the Court
held that government-induced flooding, temporary in duration, does not
gain automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection. The
petitioner, owner of 23,000 acres that are forested with multiple oak
species and serve as a venue for recreation and hunting, suffered
considerable damage, such as destruction of timber and substantial
change in the character of the terrain, due to a series of seasonal flooding
during the period between 1993 and 2000. The flooding was caused by a
water control manual of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the release
of seasonally varying rates of water from a government-owned dam,
located upstream from the petitioner’s land. The petitioner alleged that
the temporary deviations, causing sustained flooding during tree-growing
season, were a taking.117
The Court starts by noting that ordinarily, “if government action
would qualify as a taking when permanently continued, temporary
actions of the same character may also qualify as a taking.”118 Also, in
against local or state eviction moratoria, or against the federal eviction moratorium itself. In
El Papel LLC v. Inslee, No. 2:20-CV-01323-RAJ-JRC, 2020 WL 8024348 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
2, 2020), the court rejected a preliminary injunction motion targeted against eviction
moratoria promulgated by the State of Washington and the City of Seattle. In so doing, the
court held that there is no basis for injunctive relief based on a takings claim, in light of the
principle set forth in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2176 (2019), by which “[a]s
long as an adequate provision for obtaining just compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin
the government’s action effecting a taking,” such that there was also no need to discuss the
merits of the takings claim. In Brown v. Azar, No. 1:20-CV-03702-JPB, 2020 WL 6364310
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2020), the court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction against the
federal eviction moratorium. The reasoning of the court did not address, however, the Takings
Clause, but relied on rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the moratorium was “arbitrary
and capricious” and that plaintiffs were unconstitutionally denied access to courts. But see
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, No. 20-CV-3377DLF, 2021 WL 1779282, at *6 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2021) (holding that the Public Health
Service Act (PHSA) authorizing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
combat the spread of a disease through a range of measures did not encompass nationwide
eviction moratorium).
116. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
117. Id. at 26–28.
118. Id. at 26.
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addition to the temporary taking of “outright physical possession,” the
Court reasons that “[a] temporary taking claim could be maintained as
well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to
‘a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land,’” and that “government-induced flooding of limited duration may
be compensable.”119
That said, the Court in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission
refrains from applying a per se rule for a temporary government action
that entails a “direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land.”120 At the same time, it does not simply refer to Penn
Central’s three-prong test. It seems to offer another balancing test for
temporary forms of “invasion” or “interference” that are allegedly
different from outright appropriation or from mere regulation.
First, the Court suggests that “[w]hen regulation or temporary
physical invasion by government interferes with private property . . . time
is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable
taking.”121 Second, it looks at “the degree to which the invasion is
intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action.”122
Third, it examines “the character of the land at issue.”123 Fourth, it looks
at “the owner’s ‘reasonable investment-backed expectations’ regarding
the land’s use.”124 Finally, the Court notes that the “severity of the
interference figures in the calculus as well,”125 quoting an earlier case by
which “[w]hile a single act may not be enough, a continuance of them in
sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove [a taking]. Every
successive trespass adds to the force of the evidence.”126
What emerges, therefore, from the thick body of law on temporary
takings? Roughly speaking, the Court seems to divide temporary
government acts into three types of broad categories. Physical
appropriation of private property by the government—or an authorized

119. Id. at 33.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 38.
122. Id. at 39.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001)).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
329–30 (1922)).
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public utility—for temporary public use is largely controlled by a per se
takings rule. A temporary regulation, even if it blocks all use of the land
for a certain segment of time, such as in cases of development moratoria,
is governed by Penn Central’s three-prong balancing test, while
specifically considering “the parcel as a whole” regarding both its
geographical and temporal dimensions. A third category that emerges
from cases as early as Causby,127 and culminating in the Arkansas and
Fish Commission case, concerns government acts that have a physical
element of temporarily entering the land, or otherwise interfering with the
use and enjoyment of the land, without entirely ousting the owner from
the land or part of it. Such cases of temporary “invasion” or “interference”
are governed by a different balancing test that seems more favorable to
owners, as compared with Penn Central.
B. From “Fair Market Value” to “Fair Rental Value”
How is just compensation measured for temporary eminent domain
or for comparable measures that invade the property or interfere with its
use and possession such that they constitute a taking?
The basic principle established in the Second World War cases,
which dealt with explicit temporary eminent domain, was that the
compensation should not be based on “fair market value,” in the sense of
calculating the market value of the property on the date of the taking by
the government minus the market value on the date of its return to the
owner or leaseholder. The compensation standard relies, rather, on the
“fair rental value” of the asset for the said period.128 This mode of
compensation should work in conjunction with the more general
principle, reflecting the normative basis of the Takings Clause developed
in the context of permanent takings, by which “the owner must be put in
as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”129 That
said, evaluating the rental value of a vacant property, based on
comparable transactions, may often prove practically unfeasible and
normatively troubling in light of the underlying principles of the Takings
Clause. This requires courts to consider other factors in relevant cases.
Thus, in General Motors, the Court distinguishes between

127. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that frequent Air Force overflights
from a nearby airport resulted in a taking).
128. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949).
129. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
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compensation for permanent takings and that for temporary takings.
When government takes the fee, “compensation . . . does not include
future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixtures and
personal property from the premises, the loss of good-will . . . , or other
like consequential losses which would ensue the sale of the property to
someone other than the sovereign.”130 The Court justifies this rule in that
“all these elements would be considered by an owner in determining
whether, and at what price to sell,” such that these elements would be
inherently represented in the fair market value of the property. While the
Court admits that fair market value may nevertheless leave the owner
unwhole because certain consequential damages may not be covered, it
notes that “[f]or these whatever remedy may exist lies with Congress.”131
In contrast, the Court asks whether a different measure of
compensation is due when the right taken is that of “temporary occupancy
of a building equipped for the condemnee’s business, filled with his
commodities, and presumably to be reoccupied and used, as before, to the
end of the lease term on the termination of the Government’s use.”132
According to the Court, the “value of such an occupancy is to be
ascertained not by treating what is taken from [the condemnee] as an
empty warehouse to be leased for a long term,” which the government
could then artificially chop into bits of time “of which it takes only what
it wants, however few or minute” and leave the condemnee “holding the
remainder, which may be then altogether useless to him.” The measure
of a market rent should be, rather, that of “a building on a lease by the
long-term tenant to the temporary occupier.”133 This means that fair rental
value should consider at least some of the consequential costs or damages
that the owner may face, such as the “reasonable cost of moving out the
property stored and preparing the space for occupancy by the
subtenant”—in light of the assumption that this property will be
reinstated in the space by the long-term tenant at the end of the temporary
use—as well as the cost of “fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed
or depreciated in value.”134
As already noted in Part III.A above,135 differently from the General
130. Id.
131. Id. at 379–82.
132. Id. at 380.
133. Id. at 382.
134. Id. at 383.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
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Motors case, in which the term of the lease of the petitioner exceeded the
term of the temporary government use, in the Petty Motor case, the
temporary eminent domain condemned all interests in the leaseholds,
because none of the lease terms exceeded the end date of the government
use. Accordingly, the Court in Petty Motor held that just compensation
should be based on the fair rental value for the relevant period, and it
should not cover consequential costs, such as those of removal or
relocation.136
The unique aspects of a temporary eminent domain, under which the
right-holder is basically required to wait until government use is over to
return to her or his own use of the land, were featured in Kimball
Laundry,137 and led to the recognition of lost profits of the condemnee as
compensable, based on its going-concern value, rather than paying an
abstract “fair rental value.”138 This was so because during the temporary
takeover of Kimball Laundry’s plant by the U.S. military to provide
laundry and dry-cleaning services for its personnel, with most of the
condemnee’s employees being retained there during that time, the
plaintiff practically had to suspend business to its clientele for the
duration of the government occupancy.139 As the Court notes:
The taking was from year to year; in the meantime the Laundry’s investment
remained bound up in the reversion of the property. Even if funds for the
inauguration of a new business were obtainable otherwise than by the sale or
liquidation of the old one, the Laundry would have been faced with the
imminent prospect of finding itself with two laundry plants on its hands, both
of which could hardly have been operated at a profit. There was nothing it
could do, therefore, but wait.140

It is therefore not only the temporary nature of the physical taking,
but also the affinity between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation
uses that justify the payment of lost profits.
Another way in which the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation
uses were intertwined, with consequent implications for calculating just
compensation, is manifested in Pewee Coal,141 in which the U.S.

136. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379–81 (1946).
137. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
138. Id. at 12–13.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 14.
141. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
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government allegedly possessed and operated a private coal mine. The
underlying motive of the temporary takeover was to make sure that the
coal mine did not stop operating because of a potential strike over nationwide, wage-related disputes. The Court held that the seizure of the
property was not a mere sham and that the government “took Pewee’s
property and became engaged in the mining business,”142 and “[b]y doing
so it became the proprietor and, in the absence of contrary arrangements,
was entitled to the benefits and subject to the liabilities which that status
involves.”143 That said, the facts of the case indicate that Pewee continued
to pay the (increased) wages of the miners during that time, and thus
probably also received proceeds from selling the coal to the government.
Accordingly, the Court found the government liable under the Takings
Clause for the amount of $2,241.26, reflecting Pewee’s portion of the
operating losses it incurred during that time, attributable to the increased
wage payments it made to miners in order to comply with a War Labor
Board decision.144 Therefore, without second-guessing the Court’s ruling
that it was nevertheless the government that operated the mine, the
compensation actually reflected the financial outcomes of the temporary
public use.
Therefore, although the Court’s jurisprudence, including in the
Pewee case, has been persistent about the principle by which “[t]he
measure of just compensation has always been the loss to the owner, not
the loss or gain to the Government,”145 temporary takings may undermine
this distinction, especially when the pre-appropriation and postappropriation uses are intertwined.
In Part IV, I argue that the conflation of the owner’s loss and the
public value not only arises practically in temporary takings, but it may
also be desired normatively. This is so especially when the government’s
decision to take over an asset for a certain period of time, while engaging
in the same type of use made by the owner prior to the appropriation,
prevents the owner from otherwise engaging in a profitable activity, or if
it can be seen as opportunistic or driven by rent-seeking.

142. Id. at 116–17.
143. Id. at 118–19.
144. Id. at 117.
145. Id. at 121 (Reed, J., concurring).
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING TEMPORARY EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Temporary Takeovers: Between Urgent Actions and Wait Periods
When would government typically engage in a temporary takeover
of private property? As the previous parts already showed, this may
happen in a wide variety of cases. Broadly speaking, it seems that most
of these instances fall into two major categories, which are interestingly
juxtaposed, at least on the face of it. One category of cases deals with
various types of emergency situations, in which government urgently
needs to use the property to promote a pressing public goal. The other
category is that of “wait periods,” when a certain private property cannot
be developed or otherwise used productively by the owner, and the
government wishes to take advantage of such a hiatus to promote another,
temporary public use for the asset. Although these two categories depart
from essentially opposite starting points, they can and should be
conceptualized under a single framework to establish a legal taxonomy
of when would temporary takeovers be considered a taking, and what
should be the measure of compensation in such cases.
As for emergency situations, the previous parts highlighted the use
of temporary eminent domain during national-defense emergencies, as
well as during the COVID-19 health crisis. But other types of
emergencies exist, and these may also require temporary takeovers. This
is the case with natural disasters, such as fires, floods, or earthquakes.
While First English dealt with a temporary ordinance prohibiting
construction in an interim flood protection area, in other cases the public
intervention with private property might be more active and more
aggressive.
In Trinco Investment Company,146 landowners brought action
alleging that the U.S. government took their merchantable timber when
the United States Forest Service intentionally lit fires in order to manage
a group of wildfires. This case, which is still pending, will be discussed
further in Part IV.C in light of the government’s argument that the case
entails the “doctrine of necessity,” by which it is absolved of liability
under the Takings Clause for destruction of property in cases of actual
necessity to prevent or forestall grave threats to the lives and property of
others.147

146. Trinco Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
147. The case is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, after it rejected
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Yet another type of emergency situation, which may call for a
temporary takeover of private property, has to do with preserving public
order and fighting crime. In Nat’l Bd. of YMCA,148 U.S. troops protecting
the Panama Canal Zone occupied a YMCA building for one night during
a battle with rioters, after the building had been wrecked by a mob.
Following the troops’ arrival, the rioters set it afire. The Supreme Court
rejected a taking claim against the government, reasoning that “the
temporary, unplanned occupation of petitioners’ buildings in the course
of battle does not constitute direct and substantial enough government
involvement to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment.”149
This case will also be analyzed further in Part IV.C.
But then there is another line of cases, one which is typified by the
opposite of an emergency. Government use of public property can also
be done during “wait periods,” in which the private owner is either
practically or legally prevented from using her or his property, and the
government is interested in promoting a certain temporary public use.
This applies, therefore, not only to regulatory public control of property
during such wait period, such as in the case of development moratoria
discussed in the Tahoe-Sierra case, but also to direct physical use by the
government.
One set of cases concerns temporary easements acquired through
eminent domain for infrastructure projects, such as construction or
reconstruction of highways, railways, and subways. In addition to
permanent easements, government may temporarily take over private
land abutting the public infrastructure as a temporary workspace or for
ingress and egress points during the construction period. The scope of the
temporary eminent domain, and the required amount of just
compensation, would be specifically impacted by whether such a
temporary takeover denies the owner, legally or practically, access to the
rest of the property and to nearby sidewalks or roads.150
Next, consider the use of urban vacant lots for temporary public uses.
the plaintiffs’ motion to move the claim to an Article III District Court. See Trinco Inv. Co.
v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 530 (2018).
148. Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
149. Id. at 93.
150. See, e.g., State, by Comm’r of Transp. v. Elbert, 942 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. 2020)
(holding that under Minnesota law, a temporary easement over private land should not be
viewed as denying the owner’s distinct property right of access to and from abutting highways
during the construction period, unless government explicitly denies such access as part of its
condemnation proceedings, and therefore not granting compensation for this element).
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Large U.S. cities typically have over 15 percent of land that is vacant or
abandoned. This is so for a variety of reasons, such as shifts from
industrial to service economy, suburban migration, disinvestment in infill
property, irregular shape or small size of remnant parcels, parcels
reserved for future sale or development by private investors or public
utilities, and weak economic cycles.151 Weak cycles may be the result of
a particular crisis, such as the impact that the coronavirus had on retail
vacancies,152 but cycles are part of a larger and systematic phenomenon
in real estate.153 When private properties stand vacant or are otherwise
underutilized during a weak cycle or a wait period, this may create an
opportunity for utilizing the property for a temporary public use.
Such temporary use of either public or private land is a pervasive
phenomenon. In some cases, this may be the result of spontaneous action,
such as a grassroots establishment of a community garden or informal
park by residents.154 In other cases, the temporary use may be organized
by the city or, at least, coordinated with it. This could be so in establishing
certain types of public spaces or in holding periodic or seasonal events,
such as a farmers’ market, music performances and other outdoor events,
or art exhibitions in abandoned buildings.155 The potential embedded in
temporarily exploiting such vacant lots or buildings for serving timely
needs, fostering a sense of community, and even promoting broader goals
such as environmental or social justice, has prompted calls to systemize
such temporary uses as part of a novel land-use planning approach.156
How is such public temporary use enabled in private land? In many
cases, this would be the result of a consensual arrangement between the
owner and the local/state government, often in collaboration with other
actors interested in promoting the temporary public use, such as in the

151. Jeremy Németh & Joern Langhorst, Rethinking Urban Transformation: Temporary
Uses for Vacant Land, 40 CITIES 143, 144 (2014).
152. Leticia Miranda, What Happens to Main Street When Even the Biggest Retailers
Can’t Pay Rent? NBC NEWS (May 6, 2020, 6:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/
business-news/what-happens-main-street-when-even-biggest-retailers-can-t-n1200781.
153. See William C. Wheaton, Real Estate “Cycles”: Some Fundamentals, 27 REAL EST.
ECON. 209 (1999).
154. See Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better
Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 33–41 (2004) (describing the grassroots
growth of such spontaneous spaces across New York City).
155. Németh & Langhorst, supra note 151, at 143.
156. See generally PETER BISHOP & LESLEY WILLIAMS, THE TEMPORARY CITY (2012).
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case of music festivals, pop-up markets, or outdoor sports events.157
While such arrangements are pervasive in urban vacant lots or
underutilized buildings, this could be so also in rural areas.158
Can a local or state government pursue such a temporary use against
the will of the owner of the vacant lot or building? Obviously,
government can resort to its general power of eminent domain, with the
use of such power for a temporary purpose validated in the Second World
War cases. At the same time, adhering to the regular and often lengthy
procedures of eminent domain can prove a daunting task, as courts are
unlikely to streamline the process for taking over private land for a
temporary public use during a wait period, unlike in the case of an urgent
public use.
Some legal systems address such types of takeovers by creating a
statutory mechanism for taking over vacant lots for specific public
purposes, such as temporary gardens or parking lots.159 Interestingly, such
legislation may not even view such a takeover as a taking, requiring the
government to carry the costs of maintaining the lot and to restore it to its
previous position at the end of the temporary use, but not mandating to
pay just compensation for the actual takeover.160
In contrast, it is likely that under the U.S. legal system, following
the Loretto rule and Second World War cases, such a nonconsensual
temporary public use of a vacant lot or abandoned building would be
considered a taking. The interesting question may lie, however, in
evaluating just compensation, as this may not only pose practical
questions, but could also entail broader normative considerations in

157. See Temporary Urbanism: Alternative Approaches to Vacant Land, EVIDENCE
MATTERS, Winter 2014, at 28.
158. In the context of rural land, consider, for example, arrangements for a temporary
nature conservation of wildlife in return for a “safe harbor guarantee” by which the owner
would not be required to undertake additional conservation measures. See A.M. Trainor et al.,
Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Safe Harbor Program for Connecting Wildlife Populations,
16 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 610 (2013).
159. See, e.g., Local Governments Act (Temporary Use of Vacant Lots), 5747-1987, SH
No. 1207 p. 43 (Isr.) (authorizing local governments to take over vacant lots for gardening or
parking lots for a period of up to five years, but limiting such use so that it would automatically
expire when the owner is granted a permit to develop the lot).
160. See, e.g., RCA 2896/06 Rosenzweig v. City of Tiberias (Isr. S. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006) (in
Hebrew) (commanding the law as serving the interests of both sides, such that the local
government takes up the chore of maintaining the lot, instead of it lying derelict, while
allowing the public to enjoy it, and finding no source in the underlying Act for compensating
the owner for an order issued under the Act).
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legally conceptualizing this variety of temporary eminent domain.
On the face of it, the government could argue that the owner suffers
no actual loss or damage as a result of a temporary public use of a vacant
lot or abandoned building because the owner cannot otherwise put the
asset to a productive use. Moreover, such an owner allegedly stands to
gain from the fact that the government maintains the property, rather than
having the lot or building lying derelict and potentially attracting
undesirable informal uses, such as drug abuse or prostitution.161 To
further analogize from Loretto, one should recall that on remand, the New
York Court of Appeals empowered a statutorily-created commission to
set up compensation,162 and the commission held that nominal
compensation of $1 was sufficient because the presence of cable TV
usually increases the building’s value.163 If this is so, then even if a
coerced temporary public use of a vacant lot is considered a taking,
compensation would be regularly set at $1 or so, based on the traditional
focus on the loss of value to the owner. If this is so, this could
inadvertently incentivize the government to act in an opportunistic
manner in promoting temporary public uses, especially when the vacancy
stems also from a regulatory hiatus or delayed process of rezoning.
I suggest that such temporary public use of vacant lots or abandoned
buildings require a different approach, both practically and normatively.
Such use of temporary eminent domain might require establishing just
compensation based on the post-appropriation temporary public use. This
could definitely draw on consideration paid in consensual arrangements
between owners and governments about such uses. But otherwise, such
compensation could seek to grant a certain portion of the use value
embedded in the temporary public use, especially to the extent that the
temporary public use is otherwise commercialized, as is the case with
farmers markets, outdoor concerts, etc. Methods of evaluation for market
values of public or private assets used for certain public purposes, such
as infrastructure or recreation, are familiar in the practice of local, state,
and federal governments.164 These methods could be adjusted to assess
161. Such a phenomenon is very pervasive for both vacant lots and abandoned buildings.
See Lehavi, supra note 154, at 4, 68.
162. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983).
163. Loretto’s appeals about this decision were denied by the various courts as nonappealable. See, e.g., Loretto v. Grp. W Cable, Inc., 488 S. Ct. 827 (1988).
164. See, e.g., Richard J. Roddewig & Gary R. Papke, Market Value and Public Value: An
Explanatory Essay, 61 APPRAISAL J. 52, 62 (1993) (arguing that while “public value” concepts
cannot represent a substitute for the market when setting up levels of acceptable exchange
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the value of temporary segments of such public uses, and to allocate a
certain portion of it as compensation to the owner. Yet another source for
doing so could be an analogy to the mechanism of royalties paid to
owners of patents in cases of compulsory licenses, an issue I address in
Part IV.D below.
B. Reappraising the Public Harm/Public Benefit Distinction
As shown in Part II.B, the harm-preventing/benefit-conferring
distinction may prove difficult in examining whether a certain permanent
governmental measure amounts to a taking. In this section, I suggest that
such a distinction might make more sense, both practically and
normatively, in the context of temporary takeovers. This would generally
mean that certain types of emergency measures, aimed at halting or
mitigating a certain type of “public bad” happening at a certain point in
time, and which is not inherent in the regular use of a certain asset, should
not be considered a taking. This would be so even if such an emergency
measure involves a physical governmental invasion, and temporary
denial of possession from the owner, to the extent that such an act is
reasonably required to prevent certain abnormal effects that may have
broader-based implications. The case for not recognizing such temporary
measures as a taking would be particularly strong when the damages or
losses caused to the owner are in themselves temporary or otherwise
reversible when the harm-preventing physical appropriation comes to an
end. Such an approach draws on the more general doctrine of necessity
that exempts governments from takings liability.
Consider lockdowns and curfews imposed worldwide, and
particularly in the United States, during the COVID-19 crisis. Land uses
that are regularly considered socially beneficial, from retail to sports
events (although they may entail some externalities, such as noise or
traffic congestion, even during regular times), embed a particular risk to
public health during this specific point in time. This is so not because
owners of such businesses intentionally engage in a normatively
objectionable behavior, but because the use and possession of the
property carries a temporary risk of interpersonal contagion. This may be
so also for residential buildings. Across the world, governments have
considered the use of coercion to evacuate residents from their homes in
among the private individuals who make up the real estate market, the valuation of public
resources is still helpful in making informed public decisions). I suggest that this approach
can be utilized in the case of temporary eminent domain applied to temporary public use of
vacant or abandoned lots.
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“red zones” of coronavirus contagion.165
Generally speaking, the temporary takeover of assets that may pose
a particular hazard at a certain point in time, to both owners and
surrounding properties and persons, should not be considered a taking.
By the term harm, I do not refer here to the kind of negative externalities
that result from the incompatibility of adjacent uses in what is otherwise
a socially or economically desirable activity, but to hazards to persons or
property that result from an inherently dangerous situation, such as a
natural disaster, epidemic, criminal activity, or armed conflict. Such a
view holds valid even if there is no fault on the part of the owner of the
asset, such that she or he is also a victim of unfortunate circumstances. In
the case of permanent damages caused to the property owner as a result
of the temporary takeover, the government would have to meet the
threshold of the public necessity doctrine, discussed below. When the
costs or damages are temporal—such as loss of revenues or the need to
carry expenses for a substitute facility during the term of the takeover—
government should probably be held to a lower standard to be exempted
from liability.
Under the public necessity doctrine, government is absolved of
liability for the destruction of real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent or forestall “grave threats to the lives and
property of others.”166 Such a necessity was recognized in the context of
demolishing a building to stop fire from spreading although the fire did
not first break out in those premises,167 or the destruction of oil facilities
in a U.S. military operation.168
In the abovementioned Trinco Inv. Co. case,169 dealing with a takings
claim against the U.S. government for destruction of plaintiffs’ timber
due to fires lit intentionally by the U.S. Forest Service to manage a group
of wildfires (a practice known as “back burning”), the U.S. Court of

165. See, e.g., Jeremy Sharon, Efforts to Remove Sick from Bnei Brak Intensify,
JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/efforts-to-removesick-from-bnei-brak-intensify-622973 (reporting on efforts by the Israeli government to
remove infected residents from their homes in the City of Bnei Brak, which had a particularly
high rate of contagion, and move them temporarily to specially designated hotels).
166. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992).
167. Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
168. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
169. Trinco Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also supra text
accompanying notes 146–47.
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Appeals of the Federal Circuit held that the necessity defense requires
case-specific proof of an “actual emergency with immediate and
impending danger.”170
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims held on remand that if the
prerequisites of “actual emergency” and “immediate and impending
danger” are met, “the court turns to the ‘actually necessary’ component
of the necessity defense,” analyzed on a “case-by-case, fact-specific
basis.”171 Such necessity “will be measured at the time of the actual
emergency and imminent danger, not in hindsight, and must take into
account the information available” to the government agency at that
time.172 Finally, “the fire-fighting decisions of the agency which damaged
private land must have been reasonable under the circumstances.”173
Importantly, a reasonableness requirement is viewed as placing a lower
threshold than requiring that there be only “one feasible option” to act to
prove actual necessity. Rather, the destruction of private property should
have a reasonable basis to meet the test of necessity, such that “at the time
of the emergency the course of action chosen by the government was a
reasonably tailored response to imminent danger under the
circumstances.”174
The harm-preventing/benefit-conferring distinction does seem,
therefore, to make sense, at least in certain scenarios of emergency-based
temporary takeovers, including those involving an actual occupation of
property, as is also learned from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
National Board of YMCA,175 discussed in Part IV.A., according to which
“the temporary, unplanned occupation of petitioners’ buildings in the
course of battle does not constitute direct and substantial enough
government involvement to warrant compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.”176
If this is the case when the damages caused by the necessary

170. Trinco Inv. Co., 722 F.3d at 1379.
171. Trin-Co Inv. Co. v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 592, 601 (2017).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 599–600. For the argument that the emergency exception should also apply, in
appropriate cases, to economic emergencies, see Nestor M. Davidson, Nationalization and
Necessity: Takings and a Doctrine of Economic Emergency, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 187 (2014).
175. Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
176. Id. at 93.
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temporary takeover are permanent, the threshold for government
exemption from takings liability should be set at a much lower point when
the damage or loss is also temporary in nature. Therefore, if the damage
caused to an owner of a certain asset, taken over for a necessary
temporary public use to avoid a public danger, comes down to temporary
costs of relocation, this loss should not be considered inherently
compensable.
The case would be different, however, when the underlying property
taken over temporarily by the government does not pose in itself a public
danger, or is not otherwise related to preventing such harm for nearby
assets, but is used as part of a broader attempt to remedy such potential
harm.
Therefore, a government’s decision to commandeer private
property, such as hotels or convention centers, in order to accommodate
coronavirus patients, persons required to stay in quarantine, homeless
people, or medical first responders should be considered a temporary
eminent domain. This is so because, unlike in public necessity cases,
there is no direct link between the specific piece of property and the
imminent public danger (other hotels can be equally commandeered).
Somewhat similarly, the various federal, state, and local eviction
moratoria enacted during the coronavirus crisis, with the explicit purpose
of preventing the “further spread of COVID-19”—as discussed in Part
III.A177—rely on a more general, broad-based nexus between protection
of tenure of renters and alleviating the harms of the COVID-19 pandemic.
As explained by the Centers for Disease Controls and Prevention (CDC)
in the order setting up the federal eviction moratorium:
In the context of a pandemic, eviction moratoria—like quarantine, isolation,
and social distancing—can be an effective public health measure utilized to
prevent the spread of communicable disease. Eviction moratoria facilitate selfisolation by people who become ill or who are at risk for severe illness from
COVID-19 due to an underlying medical condition. They also allow State and
local authorities to more easily implement stay-at-home and social distancing
directives to mitigate the community spread of COVID-19. Furthermore,
housing stability helps protect public health because homelessness increases
the likelihood of individuals moving into congregate settings, such as
homeless shelters, which then puts individuals at higher risk to COVID-19.178

Therefore, the harm-prevention rationale embedded in the eviction

177. See supra text accompanying notes 114–15.
178. CDC Eviction Moratorium, supra note 105.
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moratoria does not result from the specific traits of a piece of property,
or from the harm it may cause to the public safety. It relies, rather, on a
broader-based yet much looser nexus between properties and harmprevention.
That said, there is an underlying difference between the
government’s physical takeover of private property to accommodate
persons—and by so doing preventing a broad-based harm—and the legal
consequences of the temporary eviction moratoria. As explained by the
court in Baptiste v. Kennealy,179 the eviction moratoria cannot be
conceptualized as a physical taking because the “plaintiffs voluntarily
rented their properties to their tenants,”180 and the temporary limit on the
ability to evict tenants can be viewed as a form of a (temporary)
regulation of landlord-tenant relationship that falls within the broad
regulatory powers of the government. Accordingly, these eviction
moratoria, as originally crafted, should not be considered as a temporary
eminent domain.
C. Non-Instrumental Violations Resulting from Temporary Takeovers
Although the general measure of just compensation for a taking, in
the regular case of a permanent taking, is payment of “fair market value,”
takings jurisprudence has always looked more broadly at the entire scope
of injuries that may be caused to persons from such a coercive act by
government. An inquiry into the various types of subjective and objective
dimensions of the violations of property rights,181 and the injuries that
such violations may cause, is important in order to evaluate, as a matter
of legal policy, which types of government interventions with private
property should be considered compensable takings, and if so, what
should be the proper measure of compensation. This section examines
how temporary eminent domain may be distinguished from permanent
eminent domain, in the context of identifying such non-instrumental
violations.
A key feature of non-instrumental injuries that may occur in the case
of governmental coercion in the form of a physical takeover is an injury

179. No. 1:20-CV-11335-MLW, 2020 WL 5751572, at *20 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2020).
180. Id. at *20.
181. I do not address here the question of whether just compensation should generally seek
to make the condemnee whole from her subjective perspective, and if so, how such a result
can be practically achieved in designing rules on compensation. See Katrina Miriam Wyman,
The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239 (2007).
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to a person’s autonomy or liberty.182 This is particularly so because the
initial justification for creating a system of private property rights lies
predominantly in entrenching a sense of personal autonomy and
“negative liberty,”183 a sphere of non-intervention. A coercive takeover
of privately-owned assets may violate this core feature.184
Moreover, the right of ownership can be viewed as focusing on the
owner’s right or power to “set the agenda” for the underlying asset,185
such that denying the owner of this right entails an injury that goes
beyond the mere loss of economic value that may result from a coercive
takeover.186 This may also explain why it is important, as a normative
matter, to identify a taking even in cases, such as in Loretto, in which the
actual damage is evaluated at $1,187 or even in cases in which the
infringement of the right “arguably increased the value of the property at
issue.”188
Frank Michelman has famously identified “demoralization costs”
that may result from a taking in certain contexts.189 Arguably, such costs
are presented in utilitarian terms, such that they reflect
(1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their
sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered, and
(2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production . . . caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers
disturbed by the thought that that they themselves may be subjected to similar

182. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. STATE L.
REV. 957, 966–67 (2004).
183. On “negative liberty,” see ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS
118 (1969).

ON LIBERTY

184. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 109–10 (2006) (describing this type of injury of insult as a “dignitary
harm”).
185. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275,
278 (2008).
186. This view is embedded in what I consider to be a broader-based principle, one of a
“right/value distinction,” by which property law shields legally recognized rights in regard to
assets and does not protect economic value against government-inflicted losses independently
of identifying an injury to a legal right. AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY:
NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES 33–38 (2013).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 162–63.
188. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169–70 (1998).
189. Michelman, supra note 59, at 1214–18.
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treatment on some other occasion.190

That said, it seems clear enough that identifying such costs also
entails a moral perception that is correlated with notions of fairness.191
This is especially so in light of the circumstances under which
condemnees may particularly experience such demoralization costs, such
as when the condemnation is viewed as an arbitrary or capricious
redistribution; if the burden imposed on a person or small group is a “rare
or peculiar one” such that similar burdens are not scattered across the
community; if there is no implicit reciprocity of burdens coupled with
benefits; or if the members of the class burdened by the measure were
unable to wield enough effective influence in the process leading to its
adoption.192 As for the latter point, other scholars have identified a
particular subset of “dignity takings” where the confiscation of property
involves the dehumanization or “infantilization” of the dispossessed.193
The theoretical analysis of non-instrumental injuries resulting from
government takeovers of private property is supported by a growing body
of studies on popular opinion and psychological experiments about the
circumstances under which persons feel particularly averse to such
actions, concerning both the legitimacy of the condemnation and the
compensation that should be paid.194 In the context of this Article, two
observations are particularly relevant for assessing the ways in which
temporary eminent domain may be perceived differently from permanent
eminent domain.
Under one set of studies, the particular public purpose for which
private property is taken influences the degree of legitimacy that persons
attribute to using the power of eminent domain, such that taking land to
build a road is considered more legitimate than for a construction of a

190. Id. at 1214.
191. See id. at 1218–24 (analyzing such injuries based on John Rawls’s concept of “justice
as fairness”).
192. Id. at 1217–18. I do not address here mirror-image situations, in which owners, during
times of emergency or distress, might be actually interested in government intervention, or
“bail out,” such that government takeovers might also possess “morale benefits.” See Nestor
M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 471–76 (2011).
193. See Bernadette Atuahane, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New
Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies
Required, 41 L. & SOC. INQuiry 796 (2016).
194. See STEPHANIE M. STERN & DAPHNA LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, THE PSYCHOLOGY
PROPERTY LAW 55–70 (2020).
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shopping mall,195 especially because the latter use may result in
transferring wealth to other private parties (a notion that mobilized
popular and political action in the aftermath of the Kelo case).196
Yet another set of studies links the length of ownership by the
condemnee with reactions to the use of eminent domain, showing a strong
relationship between the length of tenure and opposition to the taking,
such that taking land owned by the same family for 100 years is viewed
as less legitimate and as requiring more compensation than the taking of
property owned for two years.197 That said, no study so far addressed
differences between more intermediate terms of ownership.
What can be learned from the theoretical insights about noninstrumental injuries, and the empirical studies examining the particular
reasons for using the power of eminent domain and the temporal element,
about potential differences between permanent and temporary eminent
domain?
At first glance, the typical scenarios in which temporary eminent
domain takes place, as portrayed in Part IV.A, and the temporal nature of
the physical takeover by government, may point to a lesser degree of noninstrumental injuries as compared with permanent physical takeovers. If
so, this difference can influence our normative assessment of whether a
temporary physical takeover amounts to a compensable taking, and even
if so, what compensation should be paid.
Starting with the reasons for using the power of eminent domain,
one can argue that emergency measures requiring temporary physical
takeover of private property might be considered more legitimate by both
owners themselves and “other observers” (in Michelman’s
terminology),198 because times of emergency require us to think “outside
the box” and do whatever it takes to prevent imminent danger. This would
be so even if the emergency situation, and measures taken, are not
carefully scrutinized under the “public necessity” doctrine. To the extent
that the temporary takeover of a certain private property seems reasonable

195. Logan Strother, Beyond Kelo: An Experimental Study of Public Opposition to
Eminent Domain, 4 J.L. & CTS. 339, 352 (2016).
196. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For further discussion of the Kelo
case, see infra Part IV.E.3.
197. Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 713 (2008).
198. Michelman, supra note 59, at 1214.
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in itself and is not considered ab initio arbitrary, the need to sacrifice
one’s property interests to prevent or alleviate an imminent public harm,
such as a threat to human health and safety, might be viewed as an
inevitable result. At the other end, when one considers temporary
takeovers during “wait periods,” such as a temporary use of a vacant lot
as an informal public park, the argument for not recognizing such a
takeover as a full-fledged case of eminent domain might be based on the
notion that the owner suffers no loss.
As for the time element, although the above-cited experimental
studies addressed the impact of the length of the pre-appropriation tenure
on the legitimacy of the taking and the required amount of compensation,
a similar argument could allegedly be made about the limited period
during which the asset is taken over for public use, after which it is
restored to the owner. If this is the case, the analysis of temporary
takeovers should be distinctive from that of permanent takeovers, being
generally more lenient to the government in identifying takings and just
compensation.
But is this always the case? I submit that it is not. At least as far as
non-instrumental injuries are concerned, there could be cases in which
the nature of the government act, and the particular timing chosen for it,
might be viewed as opportunistic. This could be so when the value of the
asset is particularly high during a certain point of time, such that its
takeover by the government during that period should be viewed through
more than just a technical segmenting of time. This can be so also when
the loss that the owner accrues might have longer-term impacts because
of the particular type of asset and the ways in which reputation, clientele,
or business opportunities may be lost (consider again the impact of the
temporary eminent domain on Kimball’s going-concern value199). Not all
segments of time, and not all types of assets, are equal in this respect.
Some tend to be more time-sensitive than others. In some cases, timing
is everything, and this should not be disregarded in evaluating whether a
certain takeover is a taking and how it should be compensated, not only
for instrumental losses, but also for non-instrumental injuries resulting
from the taking.
In this sense, opportunistic behavior by the government in choosing
the timing of the temporary takeover, and even more so the type of
temporary public use for which the asset is taken over, might have a
particular bearing on such non-instrumental injuries. For example, to the
199. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 14 (1949).
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extent that a temporary use of a vacant lot for a certain public use can be
viewed as motivating the government to otherwise use its regulatory
power to forestall rezoning plans or withhold building permits, then the
temporary nature of the takeover can be seen as no less abusive than a
permanent takeover.
For temporary takeovers during times of emergency, an owner might
experience non-instrumental injuries when there is an affinity between
the pre-takeover and post-takeover uses. This could be so, for example,
when government takes control of a factory that produces medical
equipment, such as ventilators or masks, at a particular point in time when
worldwide demand for such products is skyrocketing, and government
then exports such products to global markets. If this is the case, the
temporality of the use may be considered no less or even more
opportunistic and annoying, than in cases of permanent takeover that
exhibit wealth-redistribution dynamics.
This is yet another reason why a systematic reexamination of
temporary eminent domain should look at the potential affinity between
pre-takeover and post-takeover uses for deciding whether a particular
temporary takeover amounts to a taking. Moreover, in the case of such an
affinity, compensation might also be based on the value of the posttakeover public use in calculating the “fair value.” On both points, the
next section offers an analogy to compulsory licenses for patents.
D. Lessons from Compulsory Licenses for Patents
A systematic analysis of temporary eminent domain can benefit
considerably from the study of compulsory licenses for patents. As this
section shows, when the government takes a license to use an otherwise
protected patent, the exercise of such a power is viewed by courts as
analogous to,200 or even as a direct application of, the power of eminent
domain under the Takings Clause.201
Moreover, it should be noted at the outset that in exercising
discretion about the proper method of compensation, courts prefer a
“reasonable royalty” approach over a “lost profits” one, which means that
compensation is based to some degree on the value of the compulsory
license to the government. As I argue throughout the Article, although
just compensation for eminent domain usually disregards the value of the

200. 3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 273, 276 (2017).
201. Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 756 (1999).
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post-appropriation use as a basis for determining compensation, such a
method may make sense both normatively and practically for temporary
eminent domain. This is especially so when the choice of timing for the
temporary government use points to a particularly significant public
value during this segment and when there is an affinity between the preappropriation and post-appropriation uses, as is typically the case with
compulsory licenses.
The basic tradeoff in patent law between incentivizing innovation
and granting public access to the benefits of such knowledge, while
enabling further innovation, lies in a temporary monopoly. During the
twenty-year term of the patent, the owner enjoys exclusive rights to the
invention and can set the price at which products are sold. At the end of
the term, the knowledge is released to the public domain.202 The
protection of patents may entail, however, high societal costs. This would
be so, for example, when owners of patents in “upstream” biomedical
research withhold their consent to grant licenses for purposes of
“downstream” product development, especially when such a
development requires the integration of many pieces of patented
knowledge. The monopoly embedded in patents can thus generate high
societal costs and even cost human lives.203
Compulsory licenses are a legal mechanism aimed at intervening in
the monopoly of the patent owner in extraordinary circumstances, when
the costs of the monopoly may be particularly grave. Such a coercive
measure, by which a license is granted to another private party or to
government itself, denies the owner the general right to exclude others
and to set the prices for licenses. A compulsory license is essentially
temporary. It might be granted for a specific period of time, but at any
rate, it will become redundant at the end of the twenty-year period of
patent protection. Yet obviously, from the patent owner’s perspective, if
the compulsory license runs throughout the remaining period in which a
patent is in force, such appropriation becomes practically permanent.
While the U.S. legal system does not have a general compulsory
licensing statute, unlike many countries, compulsory licensing can be
granted by various judicial or statutory mechanisms.204

202. THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 180–81 (2d ed. 2009).
203. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–700 (1998).
204. See Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States:
Good in Theory, But Not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41 (1990).
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First, because an injunction for an infringement of a patent is a
discretionary remedy, courts have exercised their authority to refrain
from granting such injunctions, entitling the owner to compensation
only—therefore establishing compulsory licenses in fact—under certain
scenarios. This has been done mostly in the context of antitrust violations
and other types of patent misuse, in which courts awarded compulsory
licenses to other private parties to foster competition, with the patent
owner entitled only to court-determined payments, mostly in the form of
royalties.205
Differently, courts have been cautious about granting compulsory
licenses to private parties due to non-use of the patent by the owner. The
U.S Supreme Court noted in an early twentieth-century case that the right
of a patentee not to use his invention is within the exclusive right granted
under the patent laws, while leaving open the possibility that there might
be situations in which non-use of a patent would prevent issuance of an
injunction against the infringer.206 Lower federal courts have later voiced
concern over the practice of patent suppression, but generally refrained
from granting compulsory licenses for the sole reason that the patent
owner has not used the patent.207
Second, compulsory licenses are permitted under federal legislation
in specific cases, such as under the Plant Variety Protection Act208 or
Clean Air Act,209 with some of these acts authorizing the relevant U.S.
Secretary or administrative agency to set the compensation paid to the
owner.210
Such statutorily or judicially-mandated compulsory licenses in favor
of private parties can be likened to a “private taking,” in which the law
denies a patent owner the right to exclude others and restricts her remedy
to court-determined damages.211 That said, this section focuses on more

205. Id. at 47–48. In extreme cases, courts have also awarded royalty-free compulsory
licenses to competitors.
206. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–24, 430 (1908).
207. That said, courts leave open the possibility of recognizing a “public interest” that
justifies the granting of a compulsory license, when such an interest cannot be satisfied due
to non-use. Lauroesch, supra note 204, at 49–52.
208. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402-2404.
209. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. IV 1986).
210. See William N. Monte, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 25 INFO. & COMMC’NS
TECH. L. 247, 252 (2016).
211. See generally Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009).
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straightforward taking scenarios, in which government takes the license.
Accordingly, I will use the general term “compulsory license” also for
coercive governmental use, as described below.
The federal government’s power to take a license without the patent
owner’s consent relies primarily on Section 1498(a) of the U.S. Code,
according to which “[w]henever an invention described . . . covered by a
patent . . . is used or manufactured by or for the United States without
license of the owner thereof . . . the owner’s remedy shall be by action
. . . for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such
use and manufacture.”212 Such an action is brought before the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, and for every such license taken by the U.S.
government, there is one right to recovery that can arise, and “that right
must occur upon the first manufacture or use by or for the government.”213
Therefore, unlike claims for infringement of a patent by private parties,
in which the patent owner may recover for continued ongoing
infringement, a nonconsensual use by the government results in the
taking of a non-exclusive license in its favor, and the remedy of the owner
is limited to a single measure of compensation.214
In some cases, the court explicitly justifies the granting of a
compulsory license for the government by the existence of a “public
interest” that affects public health, safety, environment, or national
defense.215 This would be particularly important when the compulsory
non-exclusive license is required by a state or local government, for
which Section 1498(a) does not apply. It is considered as an exercise, by
analogy or directly, of the eminent domain power of that government. It
requires, however, a case-by-case analysis of the court for justifying such
compulsory license.216
It should be noted that at least as far as the federal government is
concerned, it can also take the entire patent, and not just a non-exclusive
license, based on its general power of eminent domain under the Takings
Clause, which is generally viewed as applying also to intellectual

212. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
213. 3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 273, 276 (2017).
214. Id.
215. Lauroesch, supra note 204, at 48–49.
216. See Matthew S. Bethards, Condemning a Patent: Taking Intellectual Property by
Eminent Domain, 32 AIPLA Q. J. 81, 110–11 (2004).
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property.217 While generally it would not make much sense for
government to do so, taking the entire patent might be required in
extraordinary circumstances, such as emergency situations. Thus, for
example, government may decide to take over a company or even an
entire industry, including its associated intellectual property, during
wartime.218
Under case law, when the right taken through eminent domain is a
compulsory license under Section 1498(a) of the U.S. Code, the
compensation mechanism is based on a “reasonable royalty,” and not the
payment of “lost profits.” Obviously, the patent owner would regularly
prefer the latter method because the measure of lost profits would
evidently incorporate the value of the monopoly based on whether the
owner would have been able to set the prices, including in the consensual
granting of a license. Such a measure would have reflected the preappropriation fair market value, because it would have assumed that the
patent owner has the exclusive right to decide whether to grant licenses
and at which prices. Respectively, the payment of a “reasonable royalty”
would be preferable to the government.219
How is “reasonable royalty” determined in the case of a compulsory
license to the government? In a series of decisions, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims designed a complex multi-factor test that involves a
“highly case-specific and fact-specific analysis,’ . . . relying upon ‘mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.’”220
Moreover, although the court agrees that “the proper measure of damages
is the injury to patentee rather than the government’s taken benefit,”221
the actual development of the doctrine seems much less straightforward

217. This would be more problematic in the case of state or local governments, because a
patent is a federally granted right that exists nationwide, and therefore, it cannot be limited by
state or local territorial limits. Id. at 89–98.
218. Id. at 114–15 (discussing President Truman’s failed attempt to take over steel mills
during the Korean War).
219. See Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 (1996) (noting that “lost
profits may not be a ‘viable measure of recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1498,’ where such
damages would ‘amount to excessive compensation, rather than just compensation payable
under the Fifth Amendment’” and that “[t]he award of lost profits assumes a right to
exclusivity. The eminent domain theory of Section 1498(a) – allowing the United States to
take a license under the patent for use or procurement – is at odds with such a right to
exclusivity” (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (1995))).
220. Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 311 (2009) (citations omitted).
221. Brunswick, 36 Fed. Cl. at 209 (citing Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958,
968–69 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
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in this respect, not only because of the rejection of the “lost profits”
approach, but also because some of the components included in the
analysis refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the specific government use.
The court notes that “[w]hen determining just compensation for any
type of eminent domain action, including the unlicensed use of a patent,
equitable principles of fairness control,”222 and that while it “has
discretion both in selecting the method and calculating the damages . . .
the preferred manner is to require the government to pay a reasonable
royalty for its license.”223 Per the court, a reasonable royalty is “the
amount that a person who desires to manufacture, use, or sell a patented
article would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet still be able to make a
reasonable profit.”224 This method involves two steps: “(1) determination
of a reasonable compensation base, i.e., the total value of the infringing
items on which the plaintiffs are entitled to royalty payments, and (2)
determination of a reasonable royalty rate to apply to that compensation
base.”225
In determining the total value of the infringing items to set the
compensation base, the court looks to the “entire market value,” defined
as the “value of the entire apparatus containing several features, where
the patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.”226 In the
2017 Fastship case, the court apportioned the damages “based on the
‘smallest salable patent-practicing unit’ within the infringing article,
meaning those features within the scope of the claimed invention.”227
The more complex determination involves the royalty rate. In so
doing, the court looks at whether there is an established market royalty
rate applicable to this patent. When this is not the case, the court
retroactively constructs a hypothetical negotiation “between a willing
licensor and a willing licensee to determine the royalty rate upon which
the parties would have agreed.”228

222. Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 757 (1999), abrogated in other
respects by Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
223. This is so in addition to the payment of damages for government’s delay in paying
the royalty. Id. at 758.
224. Id. at 759.
225. Id.
226. Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 316 (2009).
227. FastShip, LLC v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 592, 625 (2017), aff’d as modified, 892
F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
228. Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 762 (1999).
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The “willing-buyer/willing-seller” approach was outlined in the
Georgia-Pacific case,229 and recognized by the U.S. Federal Circuit in the
SmithKline Diagnostics case.230 Georgia-Pacific enumerates fifteen
factors that should be considered in determining the reasonable royalty
rate.231
At least one of these factors, that of the “extent and value of
infringing use,” looks specifically at the post-appropriation use and its
value to the government, including “the extent to which the infringer has
made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that
use.”232 This factor can also consider the costs saved to the government
by not having to use other, non-infringing but more expensive
alternatives, to achieve the underlying governmental purpose.233
Moreover, in addition to the Georgia-Pacific fifteen factors, the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims has ruled that in its discretion, it may consider a
variety of other miscellaneous considerations to determine the reasonable
royalty rate.234 Here too, some of these additional factors explicitly
address the nature and extent of the government use, and the public value
it derives from it. Thus, the court may reduce the royalty rate “where the
government procurement is massive.”235 The court can also compare the

229. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d. Cir. 1971).
230. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab’ys. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
231. These factors are:
(1) current, established royalty rates under the patent at issue; (2) royalty rates for
comparable technology; (3) scope, exclusivity, and restrictiveness of a retroactive
license; (4) the patent holder’s established licensing and marketing practices; (5)
commercial/competitive relationship of licensor and licensee; (6) derivative/convoyed
sales of unpatented, accompanying materials by patentee and competitors; (7) duration
of patent and license terms; (8) profitability and commercial success of invention; (9)
utility and advantages of invention over prior art; (10) nature, character, and benefits of
use; (11) extent and value of infringing use; (12) allocation of a portion of profits or
sales for use of invention; (13) portion of realizable profits creditable to the invention
alone; (14) expert testimony on royalty rates; and (15) the totality of other intangibles
impacting a hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and licensee.
FastShip, 131 Fed. Cl. at 610 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204,
211 (1996)).
232. Standard Mfg., 42 Fed. Cl. at 763.
233. See id. at 774.
234. Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 211–12 (1996).
235. Id. at 211.
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“infringer’s profits with the patent holder’s risks and ability to license the
subject matter.” It can also “adjust the rate upward if there were
substantial capital expenditures associated with performance of the
government contract.”236 All of these factors consider, therefore, the
extent and value of the government use, and in particular, whether the
governmental taking of the compulsory license, at a particular point in
time, results in special public benefits for purposes of determining the
reasonable royalty rate that the government should pay to the owner.
The linkage between the payment of royalties as compensation and
the value of post-expropriation use is particularly manifested in the case
of compulsory licenses for essential pharmaceutical products protected
by patents. The use of compulsory licenses is prevalent in many countries
around the world, and it has been sanctified in international law, as part
of the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), as amended in 2017.237 The TRIPS Agreement explicitly
recognizes the right of Member States to grant compulsory licenses for
patents against payment of “adequate remuneration in the circumstances
of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization.”238 Moreover, in the case of a “national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use,” the granting of such a compulsory license is not subject to the
showing of an effort by the government or another proposed user to
obtain authorization from the right-holder within a reasonable period of
time.239
Furthermore, while under the original version of the TRIPS
Agreement, the use of compulsory licenses was to be “authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use,”240 the amendment to the Agreement, following the
2001 Doha Declaration,241 also allows member countries to export a
“pharmaceutical product” made under a compulsory license, when an

236. Id.
237. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (amended Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
238. Id. art. 31(h).
239. Id. art. 31(b).
240. Id. art. 31(f).
241. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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importing country lacks the manufacturing capability.242 The term
“pharmaceutical product” refers to products “needed to address the public
health problems,”243 as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Doha
Declaration, which focuses on “public health problems afflicting many
developing and least developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”244 In such case,
“adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) shall be paid in that
[exporting] Member taking into account the economic value to the
importing Member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting
Member.”245
The “compensation base” (to borrow the term used in U.S. law)
relies, therefore, on the post-appropriation value of the product to the
country issuing the compulsory license or to another country that imports
such a product. While the pharmaceutical industry has one of the highest
private, market-based voluntary royalty rates of any industry at 4-5
percent of the retail price (with the retail price evidently reflecting the
value of the exclusive patent),246 in the case of a compulsory license and
generic production, each country sets its own royalty rate. Thus, for
example, Japan has set royalties from 0 to 6 percent of the price charged
by the generic competitor, while Canada sets royalties for drugs exported
to countries without drug manufacturing capability at 0 to 4 percent of
the generic price, depending upon the level of development of the
importing county.247
In so doing, countries generally adhere to the Renumeration
Guidelines set forth by the World Health Organization (WHO), for
treating such epidemics, by which “to provide access to medicine for all,

242. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 237, at art. 31bis(1) (explaining the circumstances
when the typical obligations of an exporting Member do not apply regarding pharmaceutical
products made pursuant to a compulsory license); id. at Annex, para. 2(a)-(c) (describing the
specifications and requirements to be an eligible importing Member); id. at Appendix to the
Annex to the TRIPS Agreement (outlining how manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector are assessed).
243. Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, para. 1(a).
244. Doha Declaration, supra note 241, para. 1.
245. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 237, art. 31bis(2). To avoid double renumeration,
Article 31bis(2) further provides that “the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) shall
not apply in respect of those products for which remuneration in accordance with the first
sentence of this paragraph is paid in the exporting Member.” Id.
246. Monte, supra note 210, at 265.
247. Id. at 266.
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royalty payments generally should not exceed a modest fraction of the
generic price.”248
Following the coronavirus crisis, countries throughout the world
have either issued compulsory licenses,249 or otherwise extended their
authority to do so,250 for existing pharmaceutical products developed for
other diseases, which may also aid in the treatment of the coronavirus.
Renumeration for the taking of compulsory licenses will likely also be “a
modest fraction of the generic price.”
Obviously, calculating royalties for the taking of a compulsory
license (which in some cases may practically result in the taking of the
entire patent when the entire market pays generic prices) based on the
post-appropriation value to the government works to the disadvantage of
the patent owner. This is so because the value to the government (and the
respective general public) is one reflecting generic pricing, such that the
patent owner involuntarily “subsidizes” the pre-appropriation use value
that inherently reflects the value of the patent and its temporary
monopoly.
That said, reliance on the post-appropriation value of the asset can
and should be done also in other cases of a temporary eminent domain.
The normative case for relying on the post-appropriation value, at least
partially, is particularly strong when the choice of timing for the
temporary, coerced government use points to a particularly significant
public value during this segment, and when there is an affinity between
the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses. This should be so also
if reliance on the post-appropriation value works to the advantage of the
right-holder, as compared with calculating just compensation based on
pre-appropriation value.

248. James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical
Technologies, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], at 6, WHO/TCM/2005.1 (2005),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/69199/WHO_TCM_2005.1_eng.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y.
249. See Steven Scheer & Julie Steenhuysen, Israel Approves Generic HIV Drug to Treat
COVID-19 Despite Doubts, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-health-coronavirus-israel-drug/israel-approves-generic-hiv-drug-to-treat-covid-19despite-doubts-idUSKBN216237.
250. See Adam Houldsworth, The Key COVID-19 Compulsory Licensing Developments
So Far, IAM (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/the-key-covid-19compulsory-licensing-developments-so-far.
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E. Recalibrating Just Compensation for Temporary Eminent Domain
This section outlines some key principles that should govern the
payment of just compensation for temporary physical takeovers that
amount to a taking. Although the baseline for such compensation, as
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, has been one of “fair rental value”
while disregarding various types of consequential damages, this section
highlights various instances under which the payment of just
compensation should reflect additional or entirely different value
components. As noted in earlier parts of this Article, particular attention
is paid to situations in which the government’s choice to take over a
certain asset at a specific point in time results from a particularly high
public value that the asset may have during that time, or even from
opportunism. Also, this section argues that for temporary eminent
domain, a close affinity between the pre-appropriation and postappropriation uses may call for calculating compensation as a certain
percent of the value of the public use, even if this is not the case with
permanent eminent domain.
A caveat is in order at the outset. This Article focuses on the “just
compensation” requirement in the federal constitution’s Takings Clause
and the interpretation and implementation of this term by the U.S.
Supreme Court and lower courts. That said, takings jurisprudence,
including explicit eminent domain proceedings or commandeer orders, as
well as inverse condemnation claims, may also involve a variety of
federal legislative and regulatory norms alongside state constitutional
law, statutory law, and common law. This variety has both procedural
and substantive implications for calculating compensation, creating
potential divergences between different types of actions. Accordingly,
any call for reform in the principles of compensation, such as the ones
made in this Article, should ideally be incorporated in the various federal
and state law norms that may apply.
For example, inverse condemnation suits against non-federal
defendants are often brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“civil action for
deprivation of rights”),251 also known as 1983 actions.252 The U.S.

251. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
252. Siegel & Meltz, supra note 95, at 520–21; see also Knick v. Township of Scott, 139
S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (holding that a property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings
claim when a non-federal government takes his property without paying for it, so that he can
bring a claim in federal court under § 1983 without being required to exhaust state law
remedies beforehand).
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Supreme Court has typified 1983 actions as inherently different from
condemnation proceedings, not only in the sense that the former are
initiated by property owners rather than by government, but more
substantially in that a 1983 action “creates a species of tort liability.”253
This is so because unlike the case of an eminent domain proceeding, in
which liability is uncontested and a dispute may arise only in regard to
the amount of compensation, in a 1983 action the plaintiff must prove
that a certain government act is an invasion of rights that amounts to an
uncompensated taking. If this is the case, government is held liable in
damages for the wrongful denial of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to
the payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the Court has interpreted
1983 actions “in light of the background of tort liability.”254
But once the right to compensation in a 1983 action is based on tort
law, this also means that it will be limited by its traditional principles,
such that the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover compensatory
damages (but only nominal damages) in a 1983 action “absent proof of
actual injury.”255 Moreover, under the traditional common law of
trespass, compensatory damages are paid for actual harm, such that in the
absence of damage or diminution in market value, owners were limited
to nominal damages of one dollar to mark that a legal wrong has been
inflicted on them.256
The principles of the law of trespass may also impact temporary
government encroachments. This is so because courts have held that
“where a landowner suffers specific damage to his property as a result of
the negligent acts of a party with the power of eminent domain, the proper
action lies in trespass,”257 whereas when the injury “is a direct result of
intentional action,” the plaintiff can initiate a de facto condemnation
claim in addition to or following a cause of action in trespass.258

253. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 755 (1999)
(quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)).
254. Id. at 709–15.
255. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992).
256. Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1393–95 (2013) (suggesting, however, that courts have in recent years become more
receptive to the idea that the traditional measure of damages fails to protect properly the rights
of owners, and are also introducing punitive damages in some cases).
257. Poole v. Township of District, 843 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
258. In re Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Auth., 166 A.3d 553, 561–63 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2017).
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These limits on compensation may therefore have a particular
bearing on some of the instances of temporary government takeovers that
have been discussed in previous parts and are explored further in this
section, such as when government temporarily takes over a vacant lot or
abandoned building for a certain public use, or commandeers a hotel at a
time of low or no market demand, while arguing that the owner does not
suffer an actual damage as a result of the temporary takeover. To the
extent that the normative arguments made in this Article justify the
reconsideration of some of the “just compensation” principles developed
in the context of the Constitution’s Takings Clause jurisprudence, this
should also prompt a reconsideration of other principles in federal and
state law that have a bearing on various causes of actions dealing with
temporary eminent domain.
1. Fair Rental Value When There is No Clear Present Value
As shown in Part III.A above, just compensation established in case
law for temporary eminent domain is generally based on the market value
of renting the asset for the relevant period, being “the price that a willing
lessee would pay to a willing lessor for the period of the taking,”259 or the
market-rate rent of a “building on a lease by the long-term tenant to the
temporary occupier.”260
But what happens when the land or buildings erected on it have no
clear present value? Consider the case of hotels or convention centers that
stand empty during the coronavirus crisis due to lockdown or travel
restrictions, or simply because of lack of demand due to health concerns.
What compensation should be paid by government when it commandeers
such properties to accommodate coronavirus patients, people required to
be in quarantine, or homeless people?
If government engages in voluntary transactions with owners of
hotels or convention centers, consideration paid in such cases can serve a
point of reference for the payment of just compensation in the case of
temporary eminent domain or commandeer orders for equivalent assets.
What should be done if there is no clear market reference relevant
for such an extraordinary period? Should compensation be fixed at zero—
if government takes full command over the operation of the provisory
public use—or limited strictly to out-of-pocket expenditures if the owner

259. Heydt v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 286, 309 (1997).
260. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945).
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of the hotel or convention center is assigned with the actual operation of
such a temporary use?
I suggest that such an approach, which could be arguably based on a
concept of “no actual losses” or “no market value,” is wrong. First, it
disregards the non-instrumental injury that may be caused to the owner
when the asset is entirely taken over by the government for a substantial,
even if temporary, period of time, as well as the potential long-term
reputational damages that the owner may incur, for example, if an asset
such as a hotel is then stigmatized as “the corona hotel.”261
From the government’s perspective, commandeering or otherwise
temporarily taking private property during a time of emergency, to
prevent a public bad, when the asset itself is not part of the public danger
(unlike the case of the temporary evacuation of corona-infested
residences) should only be done if the government cannot utilize enough
public properties for this purpose. Otherwise, the use of privately-owned
properties might be regarded as arbitrary or capricious, or alternatively as
exploiting the particular vulnerability of such assets during the time of
crisis.262
The payment of compensation is therefore normatively warranted to
deter the government from engaging in a sort of a “fiscal illusion,”263 by
which it can temporarily take without compensation a hotel because the
owner cannot show a market value due to a temporary crisis beyond her
control. Accordingly, while the government does not have to meet the
high threshold of the public necessity doctrine to exercise its power of
commandeering or eminent domain,264 obliging the government to pay
compensation in such cases would require it to carefully exercise its
discretion in employing a temporary, yet significant, power to take over
private assets such as hotels or convention centers.

261. See, e.g., Catherine Carlock, Boston Hotels ‘May Face Stigma’ Due to CoronavirusLinked
Biogen
Meeting,
BOS. BUS. J. (Apr.
6,
2020,
2:40
PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2020/04/06/boston-hotels-may-facestigma-dueto-coronavirus.html; Mohammad Ghazali, Drafted as Quarantine Centres, Punjab Hotels
Stare at Losses, “Stigma,” NDTV (May 24, 2020, 11:37 PM), https://www.ndtv.com/indianews/coronavirus-lockdown-punjab-hotels-turned-quarantine-centres-fight-losses-stigma2234313.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 192–93.
263. For the “fiscal illusion” argument as a justification for the payment of just
compensation for a taking, see Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 88 (1984).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 166–74.
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What should be the benchmark for just compensation in such
instances of temporary takings? As noted above, if either of the parties
can present as evidence government procurements with asset owners
during the same period, or in past periods of emergency requiring such
temporary uses, this should serve as the baseline for just compensation in
the case of temporary eminent domain.
If no such transactions can be demonstrated, compensation should
include, at the very least, reasonable costs incurred to the property owner
because of the need to remove certain fixtures or amenities during the
time of the temporary use, the costs of refurbishment of the asset at the
end of the temporary use, as well as a fixed sum which should represent
the potential long-term reputational effects that such a temporary use may
have on the future market image of the asset. Such an estimate could be
based on future-looking reputational damages in other fields of law.265
As for the payment of daily rates per room in the case of a hotel (or
for an entire space in the case of a convention center), the court can offer
a conservative evaluation by looking at the history of market prices, and
adopting a certain minimum rate that reflects times of lower market
demand. The purpose here should be one of striking a proper balance
between making payments of compensation that would cover costs and
potential consequential damages while also deterring government against
opportunism, and refraining from excessive payments that would amount
to an unjustified windfall (such as payment of compensation equivalent
to hotel rates during times of peak market demand).
What should be the case for the mirror-image of temporary public
use of vacant lots or abandoned buildings during “wait periods”? Once
again, to the extent that the court can identify arms-length transactions
made between landowners and governments or private parties for the
temporary use of a vacant lot or abandoned building for similar uses, then
such consideration can serve as a basis for calculating just compensation
in the case of temporary eminent domain.
When this is not the case, I argue that trying to reconstruct a precondemnation market value for the vacant lot or abandoned building,
based on a hypothetical “highest and best use” of the land given the

265. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693–99 (1986) (discussing the role of reputation
in the marketplace as “property” and the conditions under which persons or businesses should
be compensated for market reputational damages in defamation cases).
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zoning scheme in force,266 would be practically difficult and normatively
problematic in the context of a temporary eminent domain. This is
especially so when the timeframe of the public use is not particularly long
and the temporal vacancy is due to market dynamics, such that awarding
the owner compensation based on a time-segment of long-term “highest
and best use” would amount to a windfall. At the same time, awarding no
compensation based on the argument that the land or building has no
actual value at the particular point in time in which it is temporarily taken
might create an ill-incentive for local governments to delay the granting
of building permits of procedures of rezoning in order to have privately
owned land available “for free” (thus constituting another variety of fiscal
illusion).
The appropriate solution for calculating just compensation in such
cases should be one of shifting the focus from the pre-appropriation
market value to the post-appropriation public value. As noted above,
local, state, and federal governments are routinely using evaluation
methods for establishing the long-term value of various public uses, from
infrastructure to recreation.267
Accordingly, the payment of just compensation could be based on
paying the landowner a certain percent of the relevant time-segment value
of the public use. In case the public use operated by the government is
commercialized, such as by selling concessions to vendors in farmers
markets or a temporary public park, or charging other fees from
businesses, 268 such revenues should be incorporated in assessing the
temporal public value and the derivative portion that should be paid to
the landowner for the coerced use of the property during the relevant
period of time. As I show in subsection (3) below, such profit-sharing
would make sense normatively and practically.
2. Considering Actual Damages and Lost Profits
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in the General Motors case, the
calculation of “fair market value,” in the case of a permanent taking,

266. See Stephen Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under Takings Theory, 21
URB. LAW. 113, 128 (1989) (“[T]he highest and best use is derived from the analysis of all
present and prospective uses which are not speculative.”).
267. See supra text accompanying note 164.
268. For a critical view of the growing commercialization of urban public space, see
Andrew Smith, Paying for Parks. Ticketed Events and the Commercialisation of Public
Space, 37 LEISURE STUD. 533 (2018).

746

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

measures the long-term market value of the fee. But it does not include
in addition consequential damages or costs, such as loss of profits,
expenses of moving removable fixtures and personal property, or loss of
goodwill that inheres in the location of the land, because “all these
elements would be considered by an owner in determining whether, and
at what price to sell.”269 In the case of temporary eminent domain and the
payment of “fair rental value,” the rule against payment of just
compensation for consequential damages or lost profits would apply
when the term of the temporary government takeover exceeds the term of
a lease for which a leaseholder is compensated, as was the case in Petty
Motors,270 or when the premises are vacant when taken over by the
government and then returned to the owner in similar condition at the end
of the term. In contrast, as demonstrated in General Motors, matters
change in the case of a “temporary occupancy of a building equipped for
the condemnee’s business, filled with his commodities, and presumably
to be reoccupied and used, as before . . . on the termination of the
Government’s use.”271 Just compensation should include at least some of
the consequential costs or damages to the condemnee, such as the costs
of temporary removal and storage of personal property and the cost of
“fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed or depreciated in value.”272
Another measure of compensable actual damages or costs has been
demonstrated in the Pewee Coal case,273 in which the U.S. government
allegedly possessed and operated a private coal mine from May 1 to
October 12, 1943, to prevent a potential strike over a nation-wide, wagerelated dispute, but the actual payment of wages to the miners was
continued to be done by Pewee Coal. Accordingly, the Court viewed as
compensable operating losses the increased wage payments that Pewee
Coal made to miners during that period, to comply with a War Labor
Board decision.274
The payment of damages or costs, in addition to, or in lieu of, “fair
rental value,” is relevant also for a variety of cases, in which courts
recognize as temporary physical takings government actions that interfere
269. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
270. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379–81 (1946); see also supra text
accompanying notes 76–77, 135–36.
271. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 380.
272. Id. at 383–84.
273. See United States. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
274. See id. at 117.
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with the possession and use of private properties, without entirely taking
over them. One such example has to do with the intermittent flooding
cases, discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission case,275 and the temporary or permanent damages
caused to land, including destruction of timber, due to such form of
temporary taking.
What about loss of profits? When would an owner of an asset be
entitled to compensation on the lost revenues that she could have made
by using the asset during the period in time in which it was taken over by
the government, when such revenues exceed the fair rental value of the
asset?
The most prominent case in which the owner of an asset was
compensated for the temporary loss of its going-concern value is Kimball
Laundry.276 As analyzed in Part III.B, the payment of just compensation
for the loss of profits during the time of the temporary eminent domain
was based on the fact that the U.S. military took over the laundry plant
because it wanted to use it for the same purpose—but for the benefit of
the military personnel—while retaining most of Kimball Laundry’s
employees, meaning that the condemnee had to suspend business to its
own clientele and lost its trade routes and going-concern value for the
duration of the government occupancy.277
Therefore, unlike the case in which land or another piece of property
is temporarily taken from the owner, but she can move her business
elsewhere by reinvesting the compensation paid, in Kimball Laundry, the
pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses were affiliated not only
thematically, but also physically in the sense that the owner’s line of
business remained “locked” in the premises, and it had to wait until the
end of the eminent domain to resume its own activity.
That said, there are good reasons to limit compensation for
temporary lost profits, both practically and normatively, at least in these
instances in which the condemnee’s ability to engage in productive
activity is not entirely captured by government for the duration of the
taking.
This should be so particularly when the underlying reason for using
the power of eminent domain lies in a justifiable public purpose that seeks

275. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
276. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
277. Id. at 3, 16; see also supra text accompanying notes 78–80, 137–40.
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to limit a monopolistic stance that the owner enjoyed in owning and
controlling the asset. As the case study of compulsory licenses for patents
discussed in Part IV.D shows, the basic premise behind the authority
granted to government to take compulsory licenses, or even the entire
patent, lies in the fear that the owner could “hold up” the use of the patentprotected knowledge to promote a socially-desirable goal by requiring
that the payment or royalties or consideration for the patent would reflect
its monopolistic value. Probably the most prominent example has to do
with the taking of a license in a patent-protected pharmaceutical
knowledge to allow for the generic production of life-saving medicines
at affordable prices. Allowing the patent owner to recoup lost profits
resulting from the loss of monopolistic prices undermines the very
purpose for which the power of eminent domain is granted. This is why
the payment of a “reasonable royalty” in such cases should be calculated
as a certain percent of the price of a generic product, rather than that of a
monopolistic product. In other words, the payment of lost profits should
be denied, both practically and normatively, when the pre-appropriation
use and market dynamic are considered as requiring a government
takeover.
3. Sharing in Revenues/Benefits from the Public Use
The U.S. Supreme Court has persistently held that “[s]ince the owner
is to receive no more than indemnity for his loss, his award cannot be
enhanced by any gain to the taker,”278 and it has done so also in the
context of temporary physical takings.279 That said, as a practical matter,
courts often do resort to the post-appropriation use and value as a basis
for calculating just compensation, as is the case with the payment of
royalties for compulsory licenses as a fraction of the post-appropriation
value of generic production of pharmaceutical products by or for the
government.280 While in such cases, the sharing of revenues in the public
value puts the patent owner in a worse spot as compared with basing
compensation on the pre-appropriation value, in other cases a condemnee
may stand to benefit from assessing just compensation as a fraction of the
public value. Such an approach may also be normatively justified for
some types of temporary eminent domain.

278. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943).
279. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“It is the owner’s loss, not the
taker’s gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken.”).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 246–50.
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The debate about whether just compensation should also reflect
post-appropriation value is predominantly held in the context of
permanent eminent domain, when the public purpose for which private
property is taken can yield monetary profits to government or to other
private parties to which rights in the confiscated asset are later
transferred. This longstanding debate has been reinvigorated following
the Kelo decision,281 which validated the use of eminent domain for
economic development (or redevelopment), meaning in that case that
dozens of properties were appropriated by government and then
transferred to Pfizer for a research facility and to other private companies
to develop waterfront hotels, offices, retail spaces, and other for-profit
uses.282
A few years later, another high-profile debate arose in New York
State, when the Court of Appeals validated the use of the State’s and New
York City’s eminent domain power for the Atlantic Yards project in
Brooklyn, 283 in which dozens of private properties, among them
apartments, were taken to set up a $5 Billion mixed-use private
development including the Barclays Center sports arena.284
Out of numerus proposals to fix the compensation regime for
eminent domain, a few explicitly focus on establishing just
compensation, at least partially, on the asset’s post-appropriation value.
Amir Licht and this author have addressed large-scale, for-profit
development projects that require the assembly of land from numerous
owners.285 The potential anticommons problem arising from the need to
assemble consent,286 in the face of potential holdouts, may justify
government intervention through eminent domain. At the same time, the
arbitrage between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation values of
the land may skew the incentives of government and other stakeholders
for initiating such land development projects, and would leave
landowners undercompensated. To resolve this problem, while
recognizing that the taking component of eminent domain may need to
281. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
282. See LEHAVI, supra note 186, at 214–15.
283. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d. 164 (N.Y. 2009).
284. See LEHAVI, supra note 186, at 223–25.
285. See Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1704 (2007).
286. See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
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remain an involuntary nonmarket transaction, we proposed a marketbased mechanism for the compensation component in the form of a
Special-Purpose Development Corporation (SPDC). An SPDC would
acquire unified ownership of the land and the development project, and
would offer condemnees a choice between receiving pre-project “fair
market value” compensation or pro rata shares in the SPDC. The SPDC
would emerge from this stage with several stockholders, including
landowners-turned-shareholders. The SPDC would then either auction its
land rights or else negotiate these land rights with potential developers,
with such sale or auction prices evidently reflecting at least some of the
post-appropriation value of the assembled lands. The SPDC would then
distribute the net proceeds from the sale as dividends to its shareholders.
Landowners-turned-shareholders may be thus entitled to some of the
post-appropriation value.287
Writers have also suggested other mechanisms that may be based, at
least partially, on the post-appropriation value of the condemned
property. Under one suggestion, in the case of eminent domain for the
purpose of constructing a sports stadium, condemnees will be entitled, in
addition to the payment of pre-appropriation fair market value, to postappropriation periodic payments deriving from a local property tax or
sales tax imposed on concession items and other goods sold at the
stadium, which would be levied on the stadium owner or the relevant
sports team.288
While payment of just compensation based, at least partially, on
post-appropriation value remains contested and has not been recognized
in the doctrine dealing with permanent eminent domain, I argue that such
a concept would make particular sense, both normatively and practically,
in some instances of temporary eminent domain. This should be so
especially when the government attributes a particularly high value to
taking over the assets during a specific point in time, and when there is
an affinity between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses.
Consider, for example, a government’s hypothetical decision to take
over a company that engages in the production of goods with a
particularly high value during a certain time of emergency (even if not
patent-protected), such as high-end ventilators during the COVID-19
crisis. It does so for the purpose of providing such goods at lower prices

287. See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 285, at 1731–35.
288. See Reymond Huang, Eminent Domain and Stadium Construction: Why “Just”
Compensation Is Insufficient, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 79, 97–99 (2019).
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to the local population, but at the same time, it exports surplus products
it makes in the plant to other countries at higher prices, while taking
advantage of its streamlined channels of commerce and distribution to
such countries. Once the crisis and the increased temporary demand are
over, it hands the plant back to the owner.
In such a case, paying the condemnee only “fair rental value” or even
some additional measure of lost profits reflecting its pre-appropriation
going-concern value (as was the case in Kimball Laundry)289 would
incentivize the government to act opportunistically during a time of
emergency and would deny the owner of singular temporary profits she
could have enjoyed, at least partially.
The solution for such a potential problem should not necessarily lie
in flatly denying the government from using its power of temporary
eminent domain (to the extent that this can allow for more effective use
and distribution of the goods) but rather in recalibrating just
compensation, so that it would reflect at least a certain percent of the postappropriation value stemming from market sales, somewhat similarly to
the payment of royalties in cases of compulsory licenses for patents. Such
a measure would reflect a truly “fair value” when government engages in
such types of temporary eminent domain or commandeer orders,
discussed in earlier parts of this Article.
F. A New Taxonomy of Temporary Eminent Domain
The analysis offered in this Article sets the ground for a new
taxonomy of temporary eminent domain, one which identifies a set of key
factors that distinguish temporary government takeovers from permanent
ones, and that accordingly establishes parameters for deciding which
types of temporary takeovers amount to a taking, and how should just
compensation be set in such cases.
These factors, investigated in this Article by referring to case law
and other actual instances of temporary physical takeovers include, inter
alia, the following considerations:
(1) The scope of the temporary physical takeover and whether it
practically denies the owner or leaseholder from possessing and using the
asset, as demonstrated in the Arkansas case concerning intermittent
flooding, discussed in Part III.A.

289. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
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(2) Is the temporary takeover intended to prevent a temporary and
exceptional public harm resulting from the asset itself, and which is not
derived from the long-term productive use of the asset, as discussed for
various scenarios in Part IV.B?
(3) For purposes of establishing the amount of just compensation:
are there specific harms or costs to the right-holder resulting from
delivering the asset to government and/or from repossessing the asset
after the temporary use, as discussed in analyzing the differences between
the General Motors and Petty Coal cases in Part III.B?
(4) In order to determine whether just compensation should be
based, at least partially, on the post-appropriation value of the asset: how
time-sensitive is the temporary value of the public use as compared with
the long-term value of the asset, and does this potential arbitrage raise the
fear of opportunistic behavior by government?
(5) For purposes of establishing the basis of the temporary value: is
there an affinity between pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses,
as manifested in Kimball Laundry and Pewee Coal?
(6) Are there long-term impacts from the temporary government use
that will spill over to the value of the asset once it is returned to the owner,
as in the case of potential reputational damages inflicted on owners of
commandeered hotels that may be later stigmatized as “the corona
hotels”?
Based on these considerations, the following non-exhaustive table
may be instrumental for creating a new legal taxonomy of the power of
governments to temporarily take over private property, exercised either
during times of emergency or in “wait periods.”
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Weak or No Affinity

Purpose of Temporary
Takeover
Promoting a public benefit

Temporary takeover of
private factory for related
government production.

Temporary takeover of
private asset for unrelated
public use.

Kimball Laundry

General Motors

Pewee Coal

Petty Motors

Defense Production Act
Temporary eminent domain.
Temporary eminent
domain.
Compensation should
exceed “fair rental value”
to include lost profits for
pre-takeover goingconcern value or portion
of post-takeover value in
appropriate cases.

Compensation: fair rental
value + consequential costs
or damages due to
temporary
removal/relocation of
assets.
Temporary takeover of
vacant lots / abandoned
buildings in “wait periods”
for public use.

Temporary eminent domain.
Compensation should
reflect portion of value of
temporary public use,
including revenues from
concessions and other forms
of commercialization.
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Compulsory license for
governmental use of a
patent.

Eminent domain
(practically temporary
because of patent
expiration after 20 years).

Affinity between
Pre-Takeover and
Post- Takeover
Uses
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Temporary physical
invasion that does not oust
the owner, to promote a
government use.
Elbert: construction
easement
Causby: overflights

Compensation:
“Reasonable royalty”
should also consider
value of government use
(Georgia-Pacific,
Fastship) or be calculated
on the basis of generic
pricing (TRIPS).

Temporary eminent domain
if invasion meets factors set
forth in Arkansas (Part
III.A).

Strong or Substantial
Affinity

Weak or No Affinity

Temporary takeover of
hazardous premises (such
as for evacuation of
infected residences), while
inflicting temporary
damage to owner.

Temporary takeover of
hotels or convention centers
to accommodate corona
patients, people under
quarantine order, homeless,
violent spouses.

Generally, not
compensable.

Temporary eminent
domain.

Temporary takeover of
non-hazardous premises to
prevent danger from
interconnected asset, while
inflicting temporary
damage to owner.

Compensation: If there is
no current market demand,
just compensation should
include full indemnification
for costs (or low-end past
market rates) plus potential
stigma damage.

Just compensation should
reflect permanent damages,
or diminution in market
value.

Purpose of Temporary
Takeover
Preventing a Public Harm
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Government should meet
lower threshold of
necessity.
Temporary takeover of
hazardous premises, while
inflicting permanent
damage.
National Board of YMCA.

Temporary physical
invasion that does not oust
the owner, to prevent public
harm not generated by the
asset itself.
Arkansas Game & Fish:
government-induced
flooding from military dam.

Generally, not
compensable.
Temporary takeover of
non-hazardous premises to
prevent danger from
interconnected asset, while
inflicting permanent
damage to owner.
Bowditch: demolition of
building to stop spread of
fire.

Temporary eminent domain
if invasion meets factors set
forth in Arkansas (Part
III.A).
Just compensation should
reflect permanent damages,
or diminution in market
value.

Trinco: “back burning.”

Government should meet
public necessity doctrine.

Table 1: Taxonomy of Temporary Takeovers of Private Property by
Government
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V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 crisis exemplifies, probably more than any other
time of emergency in recent history, the challenges of government action
in the face of rapid changes, uncertainty, and imperfect information. Such
a crisis requires governments to act quickly, often having to change
course time and again within a short period of time, in order to effectively
tackle unprecedented and complicated contingencies that affect every
aspect of our lives. In such times, government needs to have access to
resources, from real estate to medical knowledge, that are essential for
handling the crisis, alleviating imminent risks, and providing relief to its
residents.
In some cases, the government may need to exercise its powers to
physically take over private property on a temporary basis in order to a
promote a pressing public purpose. While the tentative importance of
granting such power to the government is evident, and the temporary
nature of the government appropriation is in many cases truly
distinguishable from permanent appropriations, it is essential to take
stock of the various costs that property owners may incur even during a
limited amount of time, and whether some of these costs may spill over
beyond the term of the takeover. Moreover, it is essential to make sure
that the government uses its powers for a truly justified purpose and in a
manner that is tailored to the particular circumstances calling for such
temporary measures, and does not abuse the time of emergency to engage
in opportunistic or rent-seeking behavior.
This Article has set out to offer a new and comprehensive taxonomy
temporary
eminent domain, seeking to distinguish between
of
intermittent takeovers that amount to a compensable taking and those that
do not, and to offer a consolidated theoretical analysis for temporary
physical takeovers that take place during times of emergency alongside
those that happen in “wait periods.”
In so doing, this Article has shown that while the harm/benefit
distinction is often untenable in the case of permanent government
measures, it might make sense in identifying which types of temporary
nonconsensual measures may be regarded as a temporary physical taking.
Moreover, temporary eminent domain needs to be distinguished,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, from permanent eminent domain in
identifying the basis for just compensation. A simplistic transition from
“fair market value” in the case of permanent eminent domain to “fair
rental value” for temporary eminent domain is often inappropriate.
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Because of the unique aspects of temporary physical takings, legal rules
on compensation should often seek to cover lost profits or actual damage,
which may occur to the property owner before and after the temporary
takeover.
In some cases, compensation for temporary eminent domain should
be based on the value to the government (and the public) from the
temporary use of the property, although such a concept does not apply to
permanent eminent domain. This should be so especially when the
government attributes a particularly high value to taking over the assets
during a specific point in time (and this time only), and when there is an
affinity between the pre-appropriation and post-appropriation uses, such
that the government’s action may be even considered opportunistic—
exploiting the specific asset for a short segment of time and profiting from
this use, at the expense of the owner. The payment of just compensation
should be therefore attuned to reflect the particular imbalance of power
between government and private parties that may occur in the case of
temporary eminent domain.

